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which is referred to κόσμος, and the derogatory manner of talking about σάρμα. To what extent can the most beautiful κόσμος be compared to a heap of scattered things? To the extent that we compare it with the πῦρ that brings forth. Compared with the fire that brings forth to appearance, the most beautiful κόσμος seems like a heap of scattered things. If we read Fr. 124 in this way, it can support our interpretation of Fr. 30, which depends on the superiority of fire vis-à-vis the κόσμος.
HEIDEGGER: It is difficult for me to comprehend that the most beautiful κόσμος stands in need of yet another determination.
FINK: I understand the fragment such that the most beautiful κόσμος receives the negative character of a heap of scattered things in reference to the ἕν of πῦρ.
HEIDEGGER: Thus, the question is whether Fr. 124 can be used as support for the explication of Fr. 30.
FINK: The κάλλιστος κόσμος can be characterized as a confused heap not only in reference to the ἕν of πῦρ, but also in reference to the other ἕν, which first comes to view with the dimension of death.
HEIDEGGER: Above all, I am concerned to make clear to the participants the manner in which you proceed. You set yourself off from the more naive, smoother version and prefer the more difficult version. If we read Fr. 30 smoothly, then it concerns a statement about the κόσμος that is brought forth neither by one of the gods nor by a human, but that always was, is, and will be eternal-living fire. Then the κόσμος is something that is. This statement is then, as you wish to say, completely unphilosophical. {GA 15: 109}
FINK: A certain philosophical element would then lie only in the ἀεί, in the eternalness of the world.
HEIDEGGER: You say that, however, under the presupposition that Heraclitus is a philosopher. In Heraclitus' time, however, there were as yet no philosophers.
FINK: To be sure, Heraclitus is no philosopher, but he is still a φίλος τοῦ σοφόν, a friend of σοφόν.
HEIDEGGER: That means that you do not interpret Heraclitus metaphysically. As against the naive rendition, you require a philosophical rendition that is not yet metaphysical. From what hermeneutical position do you attempt that?
FINK: It puzzles me that πῦρ ἀείζωον should be spoken of as the essential predicate of κόσμος, while κόσμος, as the joining of πάντα, steered by lightning and standing in the light-shine of Ἥλιος, can not itself be the fire but is the work of fire. In the antecedent phrase it is said that this κόσμος is brought forth to appearance neither by one of the gods nor by a human. Surprisingly, we must now ask to what extent it can be said that no human has brought forth the entire order of things. This negation is only possible because humans are distinguished by a