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possible through it. Herein lies a covering of the original by the derivative. {GA 15: 113} Were we to appease ourselves with the immediate wording of the fragment, and give preference to the smoother rendition, then πῦρ ἀείζωον would have past and future; and it would now no longer be what it was, and not yet be that which it is coming to be.
HEIDEGGER: We have said that we no longer interpret metaphysically a text that is not yet metaphysical. Is the no-longer-metaphysical already included in the not-yet-metaphysical.
FINK: That would be Heraclitus interpreted by Heidegger.
HEIDEGGER: It does not concern me to interpret Heraclitus by Heidegger; rather, the elaboration of the reasons for your interpretation concerns me. Both of us are in agreement that if we speak with a thinker, we must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The question is only which way leads to this, and of what kind is the foundation of the interpretive step. To answer this question seems to me especially difficult in reference to time in Fr. 30. Consequently, I have asked about the "always." How should we understand it? In the setting of your interpretation, what does "always" mean? If I ask you, is it the nunc stans [the standing now], and you answer no, then I ask, what is it? Here we are faced with a question mark.
FINK: The special difficulty lies in the fact that what precedes as the source of time cannot be said at all in appropriate manner. In reference to the source of time, we find ourselves in a special predicament.
HEIDEGGER: You rightly emphasize the predicament in which we find ourselves. The difficulty before which we stand consists not only in the step of thought but also in our rethinking. We must have sufficient clarity about what is to be thought in order to hear Heraclitus in the correct manner. Nevertheless {GA 15: 114} we cannot resolve what has to be thought in terms of one fragment; rather, we must—as you have already said—have all the fragments in view for the interpretation of one fragment. I am again and again concerned to make clear the sequence of steps of your interpretation. Therefore, I have indicated that time becomes thematic with your step of thought, while in Fr. 30 time comes to view only as an understanding of time, without becoming thematic for Heraclitus.
FINK: Concerning the phrase, ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον [it was always and is and will be eternal-living fire], I will not contend that we have within easy reach an interpretive possibility that will allow us to address the source of time, which is hidden by intratemporal determinations, without intratemporal determinations. For that would mean that we would already be able to retrieve the premetaphysical language.
In this connection, let us glance at Fr. 66, which should be correlated now only in order to indicate the superiority of πῦρ vis-à-vis κόσμος and