68
τὰ πάντα. It runs: πάντα γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται. Diels translates: "For fire, having come upon them, will judge and apprehend (condemn) all things." In this translation it is questionable whether κρινεῖ must be translated as "will judge" in the sense of an end situation, or whether it must not rather be translated as "will divide." And {GA 15: 115} it is questionable whether καταλήψεται must be comprehended as "will be struck into its imprint." We must then say that fire will, at the time it brings τὰ πάντα forth to appearance, divide them and strike each thing into its imprint. Thus, the superiority of fire is also indicated here vis-à-vis τὰ πάντα, which are mentioned in Fr. 30 by the name of the κόσμος, that is, the entire order. The more difficult rendition of Fr. 30, suggested by me, requires that the subject of the first and second halves of the sentence changes. According to the smoother rendition, the subject of the antecedent phrase, κόσμος, will also be retained in the second half. Seen linguistically, this version might be the more easy; but seen thoughtfully, it appears to me objectionable. The more difficult rendition implies that in the antecedent κόσμος comes into view and is named as something brought forth, but κόσμος is held away from the power of gods and humans to bring forth. As something brought forth, the κόσμος, which arises neither from the ποίησις of gods nor of humans, points to fire's bringing-forth-to-appearance. Therefore, the subject can no longer be κόσμος in the second half of the sentence. For otherwise πῦρ ἀείζωον would be a predicative determination of κόσμος, notwithstanding the fact that κόσμος is something brought forth by fire. Thus, we must read: neither a god nor a human brought the κόσμος forth to appearance; rather, it was always and is and will always be living fire—which brings the κόσμος forth to appearance. We can understand the phrase, "was always and is and will be," almost in the sense of "there is." But the way in which there is πῦρ ἀείζωον is the manner in which πῦρ ἀείζωον bestows the three ways of being-in-time on πάντα. If we read Fr. 30 thus, a decisive advantage of fire over κόσμος emerges, an advantage that is supported by Fr. 66. The question, however, is whether we may read Fr. 30 such that πῦρ ἀείζωον, which is mentioned in the three time determinations, is the decisive factor. In this connection, we can ask whether we can also draw the superiority of fire from Fr. 31—although it includes new motifs of thought.
PARTICIPANT: Mustn't we also include Fr. 76 here: ζῇ πῦρ τὸν γῆς θάνατον καὶ ἀὴρ ζῇ τὸν πυρὸς θάνατον, ὕδωρ ζῇ τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον, γῆ τὸν ὕδατος. Translated by Diels, it runs: "Fire lives the death of earth and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air and earth that of water."
FINK: In this fragment the movement is spoken in the joining of words: fire lives the death of earth. That means that it is not a question here of a simple going over; rather, it is a question of the interlocking of