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form a totality, and that on the other hand τὰ πάντα are supposed to stand in a reference to something that does not belong to the totality.
HEIDEGGER: You would say that with the totality we have everything, that with it we are at the end of thinking. On the other hand, a manifold is mentioned that exceeds the totality. If τὰ πάντα is the totality of ὄντα, what is as a whole, is there still something which leads further?
PARTICIPANT: Although you have said that the word "being" should be bracketed, we cannot now refrain from naming being as what leads further than what is as a whole.
HEIDEGGER: Till now, the conversation was not about being. Being is something that is not an entity and that does not belong to what is as a whole. The more difficult rendition consists in this, that we do not read the fragments ontically, as we read the newspaper, that reading of the fragments is not concerned with things that become clear simply. Rather, the difficulty is that here it is obviously a matter of a kind of thinking that lets itself into something that is inaccessible to direct representation and thought: that is the genuine background.
Another difficulty is the following. The kind of thinking that thinks what is as a whole in regard to being is the way of thought of metaphysics. Now we said in the last seminar that Heraclitus does not yet think metaphysically, whereas we no longer attempt to think metaphysically. Has the "not-yet-metaphysical" no reference at all to metaphysics? One could suppose the "not-yet" to be cut off from what follows, from metaphysics. The "not-yet" could, however, also be an "already," a certain preparation, which only we see as we do, and must see as we do, whereas Heraclitus could not see it. But what about the "no-longer-metaphysical"? {GA 15: 126}
PARTICIPANT: This characterization of our thinking is temporarily unavoidable, because we simply cannot put aside the history of metaphysics from which we come. On the other hand, regarding what the "not-yet-metaphysical" deals with, perhaps too much is already said in this characterization.
HEIDEGGER: If Heraclitus cannot say that his thinking is not yet metaphysical because he cannot yet preview the coming metaphysics, so must we say of ourselves that we no longer attempt to think metaphysically, and indeed because we come from metaphysics.
PARTICIPANT: An ambiguity lies in "no-longer." On one hand, it can be comprehended in the sense or a superficial, temporal determination. Then it implies that metaphysics lies behind us. On the other hand, it can also he understood such that the bearing on metaphysics is maintained, although not in the manner of a metaphysical counterposition within metaphysics.
HEIDEGGER: You wish to say that "no-longer-metaphysical" does not mean that we have dismissed metaphysics; rather, it implies that