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The predicament of finding a concept that does not refer to building, creation or bare representation always presents itself with Husserl. In distinction to ancient philosophy, modern philosophy does not think appearance so much from the issue of what is in the openness of a general presencing, but rather as becoming an object and presenting itself for a subject. In the general concept of appearance, nevertheless, self-presentation belongs to each entity. But each entity presents itself to everything that is, and, among others, to the entity that is characterized by cognition. Presentation, then, is a collision among what is, or a representation of what is by the one who represents. But what is cannot be understood with the categories of attraction and repulsion.
HEIDEGGER: Another manner of explaining representation occurs in reference to receptivity and spontaneity.
FINK: Kant speaks of receptivity in reference to sensory data, and in a certain manner also in reference to the pure forms of intuition, space and time. Spontaneity is based on the categorical synthesis of transcendental apperception. {141}
HEIDEGGER: Which moment do you see now in Husserl's doctrine of constitution?
FINK: In his concept of constitution, Husserl means neither making nor bare perception of things which are independent of consciousness. Nevertheless, the positive characterization of the concept of constitution remains difficult. When Husserl strove to think back behind the distinction of making and bare perception, this problem remained in the path of cognition, that is, in the relationship of the subject to an entity that is already posited from the beginning. The prior question, however, is whether ...
HEIDEGGER: ... objectivity necessarily belongs ...
FINK: ... to the being of what is, or whether objectivity first becomes a universal approach to what is in modem philosophy, with which another, more original approach is covered up.
HEIDEGGER: From this it follows once again that we may not interpret Heraclitus from a later time.
FINK: All the concepts that arise in the dispute over idealism and realism are insufficient to characterize the shining-forth, the coming-forth-to-appearance, of what is. It seems to me more propitious to speak of shining-forth than of shining-up. For we are easily led by the idea of shining-up into thinking as if what is already were, and were subsequently illuminated. ἀλήθεια would then be only an elicitation of what already is in a light. However, the light, as ἀλήθεια and fire, is productive in a sense still unknown to us. We know only this much, that the "productivity" of fire is neither a making nor a generative bringing-forth nor an impotent casting of light.