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{142} HEIDEGGER: One could then say that coming-forth-to-appearance is neither creatio [creation] nor illuminatio [illumination] nor constitution ...
FINK: ... nor τέχνη as bringing forth. For τέχνη is the bringing-forth of a specific form out of the substratum of an available, though not manufactured, material ...
HEIDEGGER: ... in distinction to creatio ...
FINK: ... which brings-forth living creatures. We must thus bracket out an entire catalog of current ways of thinking in order not to think coming-forth-to-appearance in an inappropriate manner. But such a procedure has only the character of a via negationis [way of negation], and does not lead a step nearer to an understanding of what the shining-forth of τὰ πάντα or ὄντα in the ἕν of fire, sun or λόγος means.
HEIDEGGER: Coming-forth-to-appearance concerns a general reference ...
FINK: ... the puzzling reference of ἕν and πάντα. This reference is puzzling because the ἕν never occurs among τὰ πάντα. τὰ πάντα means all of what is. But what kind of allness is that? We know relative, specific allness like that of genus and species. For example, we think an allness of species in the concept "all living things." τὰ πάντα, however, form no relative allness, but rather the allness of everything which is. Yet ἕν does not fall under the allness of τὰ πάντα. Rather, the other way around, τὰ πάντα are housed in ἕν, but not-as you have once said in a lecture-like potatoes in a sack, but rather in the sense of what is in being.
HEIDEGGER: We must ask still more closely about τὰ πάντα and ὄντα. How should we interpret ὄντα? What are τὰ πάντα? {143}
FINK: For one thing, we could make the attempt to enumerate whatever there is. What is, for instance, is not just nature and her things. We could begin an enumeration with the elements: sea, earth, heaven.
HEIDEGGER: The gods belong to what is.
FINK: But with that, you already refer to what is and is unphenomenal. At first, let us stay with what is phenomenal. After the elements, we could name the things made up out of them. But there are not only things of nature. Rather, there are also artificial things that we do not come across in nature and for which there is no pattern in nature. A human shares in bringing-forth. A human begets a human, says Aristotle. That means that he has a part in the creative power of nature. Beside that, a human brings forth artificial objects. It is an open problem whether the Aristotelian analysis of the things manufactured in τέχνη. with the help of the scheme of the four causes, is a sufficient determination of the artifact. It is questionable whether artificial things have a random character or whether they have a character of necessity. Sorne time ago. you asked whether there are shoes because there are shoemakers