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implies that the abstract finite determination sublates itself and goes into its opposite determination. Against that, the abstract thinking of understanding is the adherence to the determination and its distinctness vis-à-vis the other. The entire thinking, Hegel's thinking, speaks first of all in the fundamental scheme of the subject-object relationship. The abstract moment is the representation that is delivered over to the object without reference back to the subject. It is the level of immediacy. The idea is given over to the immediately given object without reference back to mediation. If now the object qua object is thought, that is, in reference hack to the subject, then the unity between object and subject is thought. But why is this unity a negative one?
PARTICIPANT: Because thinking has not yet recognized the unity as unity.
HEIDEGGER: Think historically and concretely on Kant's synthetic unity of transcendental apperception. It is {187} unity in reference to objectivity. For Hegel, however, it is only this whole itself, i.e., subject and object in their unity, which is the positive unity wherein the whole of the dialectical process is deposited. The glimpse of this unity, that is, the glimpse of the abstract and dialectical moments in their unity, is the speculative. The speculative, as the positive-rational, comprehends the unity of determinations in their opposition. When Hegel brings Heraclitus into connection with his logic, how does he then think what Heraclitus says about oppositions? How does he take up what is said by Heraclitus about oppositions in distinction to what we attempt? He takes the opposing references of Heraclitus—spoken from out of Kant—as a doctrine of categories at the level of immediacy, and thus in the sense of an immediate logic. Hegel does not see in Heraclitus the cosmological references as you understand them.
FINK: Hegel interprets the relationship of oppositions from out of mediation.
HEIDEGGER: He understands the whole of Greek philosophy as a level of immediacy, and he sees everything under the aspect of the logical.
FINK: One could also say that for Hegel the thought of becoming is of significance in Heraclitus. One could also call Heraclitus the philosopher of flux. For Hegel, the clement of flux gains the character of a model for undoing oppositions.
HEIDEGGER: Becoming is movement, for which the three moments—namely, the abstract. the dialectical. and the spen1lative—are what gives impetus [das Ausschlaggebende]. This movement, this method, is the matter itself for Hegel after completion of the Logic. The third Heraclitean, he side Hölderlin and Hegel, is Nietzsche. But we would be going out of our way to go into this question. {188} I have touched on all that is now said only to show you where we arc at this point. Our Heraclitus interpretation has a wide perspective; it also speaks in the language of