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overcome by night and the dark. When his ὄψις is extinguished, he has the capacity, as the being with an affinity to fire, to bring forth fire and light. A human relates himself to night and day.
HEIDEGGER: Let us stay at first with night and day.
FINK: The human situation is different from that of living beings which are exposed to night and day. When {207} it is night for a human, then light is extinguished. Indeed, there is a seeing of the dark. ὄψις does not mean here the capacity of seeing, but the capacity of seeing in actu [in actuality). When his ὄψις is extinguished it means, therefore, when his capacity of seeing is no longer in actu. The capacity of seeing as such is not extinguished with the breaking in of darkness. We also do not say that a human only hears when he hears sounds. For he also hears silence.
HEIDEGGER: A human sees nothing in the dark.
FINK: Nevertheless everyone sees something in the dark.
HEIDEGGER: I am aiming at precisely what extinguishing means.
FINK: Extinguishing can have two-fold meaning: first, it refers to not seeing in the dark; second, to not seeing in sleep.
HEIDEGGER: Let us leave sleep aside. In the phenomenon, we must distinguish between "not seeing anything in the dark" and "not seeing." If we speak now of the extinguishing of sight, that is still not clear enough to me. Not seeing means ...
FINK: ... that the ability to see is dosed. With the open ability to see, we see nothing determinate in the dark. But that is still a seeing.
HEIDEGGER: It concerns me now to determine what is negated by the extinguishing of ὄψις.
FINK: One can read Fr. 26 such that a human kindles a light in the dream. Still, this way of reading appears questionable to me. When we say that a human is extinguished {208} in reference to ὄψις, it can mean either a dosing of the ability to see or a failing to find the visible on account of the darkness. The latter means that the ability to see is open, but we cannot make out anything specific in the darkness.
HEIDEGGER: In the dark I see nothing, and nevertheless I see.
FINK: This is similar with hearing. A sentry, for instance, listens intensely into the silence without hearing something determinate. When he hears no determinate sound, still he hears. His harkening is the most intense wakefulness of wanting to hear. Harkening is the condition of possibility for hearing. It is being open to the space of the hearable, whereas hearing is meeting the specifically hearable.
HEIDEGGER: If we think through what is said about "seeing nothing" and "not seeing" in the situation in which a human concerns himself with a light, for example with a candle, then how is ἑαυτῷ [for himself] out of Fr. 26 to be understood? I am concerned to preserve the ἑαυτῶ.
FINK: I do not regard it as pleonastic. A human has the capacity, akin to the day, to clear, even though in a weak manner in comparison to