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HEIDEGGER: According to Aristotle, we know nothing of sleep.
FINK: I would like to contest that. What Aristotle says in this way about sleep does not spring from a phenomenological analysis of sleep, which—as I believe—is still undone today.
HEIDEGGER: I don't contest the possibility of experiencing sleep as sleep, but I see no access.
FINK: When Heraclitus speaks of the ἅπτεσθαι of those who are awake in reference to those who are asleep, that cannot mean the exterior appearance. Touching on ... is a coming into nearness (ἀνχιβασίη), a form of approach that does not happen only objectively, but which includes a dark mode of understanding.
HEIDEGGER: If we now summarize the whole, we can say that you have already foreshadowed where you place ἅπτεσθαι. The three manners of ἅπτεσθαι are relationships that a human encounters ...
FINK: ... but a human as distinctive elucidation of the basic reference. As the counterreference of gods and humans was thematic before, now a human becomes thematic in the midst of oppositions. A human is the twilight, fire-kindling being in the counterplay of day and night. It is the basic situation of humans to be placed in an extraordinary manner in the counterplay of day and night. A human does not come forth like the other living beings in this counterplay; rather, he comports himself toward it, is near fire and related to σοφόν. What is said in Fr. 26 about references, belongs in discussion of the counterplay of opposites. What ἔν holds apart and together is thought in the image of the god, in the image of bow and lyre and in ἀρμονία ἀφανής. There the counterturning is taken in view. But here in Fr. 26, it is not a matter of counterturning, but of what is opposed ...
HEIDEGGER: ... which belongs together.
FINK: A human is not only exposed to the counterplay of day and night; rather, he can understand it in a special manner. But the many do not understand it; rather, only he who understands the relatedness of ἔν and πάντα.
HEIDEGGER: With the difficulty that Fr. 26 creates for me, I could—above all in order to clarify ἅπτεται—solve the difficulty only when I took Fr. 10 into consideration: συνάψιες ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα. συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶιδον διᾶιδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.30 The decisive word here is συνάψιες [connections]. It is the same word as ἅπτω [to fasten], but sharpened by the σύν [together]. Our German word haften [to fasten], Haft [arrest], is connected with ἅπτω. We can place a semicolon behind συνάψιες. I do not translate it with "fastened-together," but with "letting-belong-together." In the fragment, it is not said what determined the συνάψιες. It simply stands there.
FINK: I would say that the first two illustrations of συνάψιες, ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα [wholes and not wholes], prevent the σύν from being understood