| Grounding | (of the abyssal ground of the in-between as that of the truth of beyng). Da-sein appropriated in the appropriative event. |
| Those who steadfastly insist | (the first guardians of Da-sein. Not yet its grounders). |
| The last god |
(the inceptual one in the essencing of beyng, for
its appropriation, unconcerned about the human
being). A god who would like to raise himself beyond being, or indeed is thus raised and made into the source (cause) of being (not simply of beings) "is" no god and can be no god. More inceptual than every god is beyng. |
115. The History of Beyng
The first commencement is φύσις itself.
"Being" is not distinguished from truth. Both "are" the Same, which is also why the essential saying of Parmenides is immediately said: τὸ γὰρ αὐτό νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.
Being is not distinguished or differentiated from the "becoming" that is seen by Parmenides and Heraclitus in terms of the essence of φύσις and said in different ways. For both, φύσις is λόγος.
In that φύσις is said each time as νοεῖν – λόγος, εἶναι too and ἀλήθεια first come into their own clearing and into the possibility of separation. Thereby at the same time δόξα, "appearing," as the essencing of φύσις-ἀλήθεια.
How in general the εἶδος becomes essential for "being," and that is, for revealing, over δόξα in the dual sense of appearing (shining and merely seeming so). Whence δόξα?
How, with the interpretation of the εἶδος as ἰδέα, being itself becomes ὄντως ὄν and distinguished against μὴ ὄντα (εἴδωλα).
Here lies the prefiguring of being for objectivity (in the modern sense).
With the grasping of the εἶδος, φύσις, and together with it ἀλήθεια, has receded back into the commencement and become unattainable. νοεῖν and λέγειν themselves are torn away from φύσις and made the responsibility of the human; the human being himself now receives his essence as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον.