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§6. Categorial Intuition [93-94]


after the horizon has been laid open, but then one forgets that the crucial work in the field of philosophical research is always this first step, namely, the work of laying open and disclosing as such. Such research, which, one might say, works invisibly below the surface and is itself buried when the prejudices collapse, yields meager results. And practical results in logical and ontological work are unusual enough, even in Aristotle. But this is precisely our guide and direction: in order to arrive at the ground and horizon, the way must be followed in that direction; the radical and perhaps not yet explicit line of questioning must be undertaken.

Categorial intuition itself and its manner of elaboration have exercised a positive influence especially on the works of Scheler, particularly in his investigations on the material ethics of value. Lask's investigations into the logic of philosophy and the theory of judgment are also determined by these investigations into categorial intuition.

Categorial acts are founded acts; in other words, everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition. This thesis must be correctly understood. It does not say that the categories ultimately can be interpreted as sensory. Rather, "resting" here means that they are founded. We can formulate the import of the sentence in this way: Everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition, no objective explication floats freely but is always an explication of something already given. The thesis that everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition is but a restatement of the Aristotelian proposition: ουδέποτε νοεί άνευ φαντασίας ή ψυχή6; "The soul can presume nothing, apprehend nothing objective in its objectivity, if nothing at all has been shown to it beforehand." A thought without a founding sensuousness is absurd. The idea of a 'pure intellect' could only be conceived "before an elementary analysis of knowledge in the irrevocable evidence of its composition."7 While the idea of a pure intellect is also absurd, the concept of a pure categorial act still has a valid sense.

Acts of ideation indeed rest upon individual intuition but do not directly intend what is intuited in it as such. Ideation constitutes a new objectivity: generality. Now, intuitions which exclude not only everything individual but also everything sensory from their objective content are pure categorial intuitions, in contrast to those which still include sensory components, categorially mixed intuitions. In contrast to these two groups-pure and mixed categorial intuitions-there is sense intuition



6. Editor's note: De anima, 431a16f. (Oxford 1956). [H ... the soul never thinks without an image." English translation by J. A. Smith in Richard McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 594.]

7. Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II/2, p. 183. [Eng. tr., Investigation VI, §60, p. 818.]