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equivalent positions, there is a third position which presupposes the relationship of being between subject and object from the start, for example, that of Avenarius: between subject and object there is what is called a 'principal coordination,' and subject and object must from the start be regarded as standing in a relationship of being.' But this relationship is in its mode of being left undefined, as is the mode of being implied in subject and object. A position which wants to stand on this side of idealism and realism because it does not let the relationship first emerge, but which at the same time stands on the far side of idealism and realism because it tries to preserve and yet sublate both positions in their own rights, which they really do not have, is a position whose sense is always oriented to this theory. What has been said in our present consideration about knowing as a mode of being of in-being and suggested as a task of a phenomenology of knowing stands neither on this side nor on the far side of idealism and realism, nor is it either one of the two positions. Instead it stands wholly outside of an orientation to them and their ways of formulating questions.
Our further considerations will not only explicate the genuine sense of knowing more dearly. Above all, their aim is to show that knowing in its being is grounded upon more original structures of Dasein, that, for example, knowing can be true—can have truth as a distinctive predicate—only because truth is not so much a property of knowing but is rather a character of the being of Dasein itself. This may suffice as a provisional account of the phenomenon of in-being.
We now proceed to the task of disengaging the first structure, which we have identified and designated as 'world.' We ask what is meant by 'world' (worldhood and the expectant present—state of making present and of expectancy)*? What phenomenal constituents are expressed by it?
From what has been said about the being of Dasein as in-being, namely, that this in-being does not refer to anything like a spatial in-one-another
1. Richard Avenarius, Der menschliche Weltbegriff (Leipzig: Reisland, 1891), third edition in 1912.
* This parenthetical remark is a later insertion. Gewärtigkeit (expectancy, awaiting) plays no role whatsoever in this lecture course. In Being and Time (H. 337) it is identified with the "inauthentic future."