§23. Basic structure of world hood [264-266]

concerned preoccupation, the handy within reach and grasp. Such a presence of the environmental, which we call handiness, is a founded presence. It is not something original but grounded in the presence of that which is placed under care. If this handily nearest, the handy in concern, is already a founded presence, then this applies even more so to the character of reality which we learned about earlier and which Husserl claims to be the authentic presence of the world, what he calls bodily presence [Leibhaftigkeit].

In our analysis of perception, envisaging, perception of a picture, and empty intention, we explicated the kind of presence belonging to a chair as thing and already there pointed to a distinction between the environmental thing and the natural thing. This distinction was then only applied quite roughly. We can now clarify it and thus see that bodily presence is in no way a primary character but rather is grounded in handiness and what is immediately available within concern. Bodily presence is a character of encounter of world-things, insofar as the world is still encountered solely in a pure apprehension, a pure perception. It is a character of encounter of reality to the degree that preoccupation denies the world its full possibility of encounter; it is a specific environmental character which shows itself only when concern, concerned being-in-the-world, is a particularly conditioned mere looking at the world, only when the primarily given and experienced world is in a certain way excluded.

But handiness is the presence of an immediately available environmental thing such that preoccupation dwells precisely in the references of serviceability and the like as a concerned reaching for something, getting it ready for use. We can now expressly keep an eye on what is thus encountered, for example, in making an instrument present by looking after it and looking around to see whether in the end it should not be arranged differently in view of that for which it is an instrument. When we look at the tool in this way, the now handy environmental thing is thematic in its handiness. But this thematization still remains wholly and simply in the kind of sight which guides the genuinely concerned use of the thing, in circumspection. But at the same time this thematization of handiness is the transitional step to a potentially independent mode of concerned preoccupation—in the care of merely looking at ...; the handy entity placed under care is now merely viewed. For this to be possible, the environmental thing of utility must be concealed precisely in its specific referential relations as a utensil so that it may be encountered solely as a thing occurring in nature. This covering up or masking is performed by concern insofar as being-in-the-world is now modified to a state of solely looking, a mere looking which interprets. This modification of in-being means, so to speak, the attempt on the part of Dasein not to be in its most immediate