not expressly in the grip of concern, and what in its peculiar presence {Anwesenheit} is not tailored to an individual, to a particular Dasein, but what each uses in the same way as the other (what 'everyone' has at his disposal in the same sense), what is already there for 'everyone.' This already-present-something is the entity within the environing world which we call the extant and on hand, in contrast to the handy.
It will perhaps be said that just this extant on hand, environmental nature, is the most real, the authentic reality of the world, without which earth, ground, everything earthy, earthen, and earthly cannot be, perhaps not even Dasein itself. The work-world bears within itself references to an entity which in the end makes it clear that it-the work-world, what is of concern-is not the primary entity after all. Precisely when we are led from an analysis of the work-world, in following its references to the world of nature, finally to recognize and to define the world of nature as the fundamental stratum of the real, we see that it is not the authentic being in every concern that is placed under care which is the primary worldly presence, but rather the reality of nature. This conclusion, it seems, cannot be avoided. But what does it mean to say that the world of nature is the most real? Literally, it still only refers to that entity in the world which satisfies the sense of reality, that is, world hood in a superlative sense. But this does not mean that this sense of worldhood, which the world of nature as the always already on hand satisfies, is to be drawn from the world of nature understood as objectivity. Just because nature is of concern among the environmental things themselves in the environing world and is encountered in this concern, the sense of world hood can not be read off from mere nature. The environmental references, in which nature is present primarily in a worldly way, tell us rather the reverse: nature as reality can only be understood on the basis of worldhood. The entitative relationships of dependence of worldly entities among themselves do not coincide with the founding relationships in being.
Here again, we have the same confusion as above in the characterization of the 'in-itself and of the founding relationships in their explicitness. What stand among themselves in an entitative relation and these relations themselves are not identical with the founding relations in being. For the time being, it can only be said that even the extantness of nature as environing world, that is, as it is experienced quite implicitly and naturally, that just this presence {Anwesenheit} is first discovered in its sense and is there upon and in the world of concern. The work-world appresents both what is always already on hand and what is immediately handy for the particular concern. It is thus becoming clear that the analysis of the worldhood of the world is centered more and more on this distinctive presence of what is of concern. Consequently, to the extent that we succeed in clarifying this presence, it will become