as we take nature in this extreme sense of the entity as it is discovered in physics. This is connected with the fact that in this kind of explanation and discovery of the world as nature, nature is still investigated and interrogated only with regard to the presence of the entity in it; and this entity is admitted only insofar as it is determined by laws of motion which remain invariant, unaltered, always the same for every possible approach and regard under which the consideration of nature is placed. It should be observed here that all propositions and proofs given in physics or mathematics are certainly comprehensible as propositions, as discourse about something, but that about which they speak is itself the incomprehensible. As the incomprehensible, it is likewise the entity which simply does not have the character of Dasein at all, while Dasein is the entity which is comprehensible in principle. Since understanding belongs to its being as being-in-the-world, world is comprehensible to Dasein insofar as it is encountered in the character of meaningfulness.
When we consider the determination of the 'in-itself as a character of world hood , we can here very briefly recall what we said earlier, that the 'in-itself is not an original character; it still has a phenomenal genesis, it is still in need of expository interpretation, even though it is generally taken to be in no need of interpretation. Why is the reality of the world so readily characterized by the 'in-itself'? Why do we find comfort in the mere stipulation of this character without any clarification of it? It has to do with the fact that this 'in-itself of the world is introduced reactively, so to speak, against an interpretation of the being of the world as apprehended, against the determination of the actuality of the actual as objectivity for a scientifically objective knowledge. It is reactive in the counterclaim that the entity is 'in itself.' Appeal is made to the fact that all 'natural' and scientific knowing aims at the determination of an entity which is in itself in its being. But then the matter is allowed to rest with this appeal, without asking what it now really means.
If the being of the world were definable only in terms of being apprehended, then the one chance of nevertheless still clarifying the 'in-itself' would be by an ever greater disregard of the subject. But how would that be possible without the basic constitutive state of in-being? But since the being of the world becomes comprehensible in the encounter, the understanding of the entity in itself is as such revealed only in a radical interpretation of Dasein. The more originally and the