basis for the determination of the categories of objects in general, determinations which belong to every something, to the extent that it is something at all, whether it is in the world or is something thought. So bodily presence is also not a primary character of the environing world.
But reality is not adequately clarified even by the phenomenon of resistance. The Greeks obviously had this phenomenon already in mind when they prοposed the σώματα, the corporeal things, as the authentic οὐσίαι with respect to pressure and impact.2 In more recent times, Dilthey in particular, in the context of the inquiry mentioned above, has pointed to the phenomenon of resistance, specifically resistance as a correlate of impulse. For every impulse which comes from the subject and is operative in the subject there is a correlative resistance. To be sure, Dilthey did not come to a more rigorous formulation of the phenomenon, but, and this is what is most important, he already saw quite early that reality is experienced not only in knowledge and awareness but in the whole "living subject," as he puts it, in this "thinking, willing, feeling being." He wants to get to the totality of the subject which experiences the world and not to a bloodless thinking thing which merely intends and theoretically thinks the world. But he seeks the whole within the framework of a traditional anthropological psychology, as you can see from the very formulation, this "thinking, willing, feeling being." He just does not see that the adoption of this old psychology necessarily forces him away from the authentic phenomenon. This old psychology is not overcome by his new analytical psychology but only reaffirmed, thereby preventing a genuine apprehension of what is anticipated.
Most recently, Scheler has advocated a similar theory of the being of the real, but on the basis of an essentially clearer theory of the structure of the psychic, which is that of the phenomenological analysis of acts. He himself designates his theory of the 'existence' ('Dasein' in the sense of being-on-hand, extantness) of the world as "a voluntative theory of existence," which asserts that the extantness of the world is primarily correlative to will, thus to impulse, striving.
... that knowing itself, however, is a relationship of being; that the being-so of an entity can at the same time be in mente and extra mentem,
2. Cf. Plato, Sophist 246a and Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Lambda (XII), Ch. 1-6.