the Stoics, to note at least this much, classified various modifications of fear.
Theologically, the problem of fear is of special significance in connection with the theory of repentance, penance, love toward God, love of God, which itself substantiates fear. For an orientation, I refer to the investigation by Hunzinger.2 There is here a brief survey of the development of the concept, though in fact the interpretation of Augustine there is in need of essential revisions. Thomas Aquinas3 has dealt with fear in a comprehensive way in the context of a general theory of the emotions.
Also, I cannot embark here on a more detailed interpretation of Aristotle's analysis in his Rhetoric. That would be possible only on the basis of an actual understanding of the main structures of Dasein itself. We only begin to see what Aristotle saw when we first bring the phenomena home to ourselves. Characteristic of the basic conception of fear in Aristotle is its consideration in connection with the task of rhetoric. Among other things, the orator, in order to put across his plan and his proposals or to get someone to consider them, can appeal to the instincts and passions of the crowd (public meeting). In order to make the assembly more tractable, he can, for example, work for the passage of war credits by instilling fear in his listeners. He strikes fear in them by threatening them with the destruction of the state. The fear thus aroused makes them ready to take counsel, and brings them to support and to accept his proposals much more readily. This being afraid of something as a constitutive moment of oratory is analyzed by Aristotle.
The following analysis is oriented toward the previously elaborated structure of the being of Dasein, but it also makes regular reference to the Aristotelian definition. In the phenomenon of being afraid we shall distinguish 1) the of which of being afraid, and 2) the way of being toward that of which one is afraid. (We have no proper term for the first, one would actually have to say the 'frightful,' 'frightening,' or 'fearful,' if one takes these terms in a purely formal structural sense without any sort of devaluation.) Then we have 3) the about which of fearing. Being afraid is not only being afraid of, but at the same time always afraid about. Finally. we must investigate 4) the ways of being toward that about which fear is in fear.
In regard to the first structural moment, the of which of fearing, we can say that the of-which of fear has the character of something we encounter and confront in a worldly way, and so has the character of
2. A. W. Hunzinger, "Das Furchtproblem in der katholischen Lehre von Augustin bis Luther," 1906, First Section of no. 2 of the Luther Studies.
3. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae II, questions 41-44.