shall possess it as long as it lives. But since there is a dispute among you about its name, let it be called 'homo,' for it is made of humus (earth)."
In this naive interpretation of Dasein, we observe the astonishing fact that here the view is directed toward Dasein and that along with body and spirit something like 'care' is seen as that phenomenon which is attributed to this entity as long as it lives, to wit, as Dasein, which we have regarded here as being-in-the-world. Konrad Burdach, through whom I also came across this fable, has now worked out the details.1 Burdach shows here that Goethe got the fable of Hyginus from Herder and adapted it in his Faust, in the second part. Burdach then gives, as always in a very reliable and scholarly way, a large amount of material relating to the history of this concept. Among other things, he says that the word in the New Testament for 'care' (sollicitudo in the Vulgate), μέριμνα (or as it probably was originally called, φροντίς). was already a technical term in the moral philosophy of the Stoics. It was used in Seneca's goth letter, which was also known to Goethe, for the description of primitive man. The double sense of cura refers to care for something as concern, absorption in the world, but also care in the sense of devotion. This concurs with the structures which we have exposed. But does this not mean that in a certain way cura is already seen in the natural interpretation of Dasein, although not in the form of an explicit question regarding the very structure of the being of Dasein?
With the phenomenon of care, we have arrived at that structure of being from which the previously secured characters of the being of Dasein can now be made understandable, not only in their structure as such, but in the possible ways of being arising from it.2
Now that we have brought the various structures of Dasein into a certain correlation with the basic phenomenon of care, this stage in our consideration serves to provide us with the basis upon which we could critically repeat what we have heard about intentionality in our introductory considerations. It could be shown from the phenomenon of care as the basic structure of Dasein that what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon regarded merely from the outside. But what is meant by intentionality
1. K. Burdach, "Faust und die Sorge." Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissen schaft und Geistesgeschichte I (1923), pp. 41 f.
{2.} Editor's note: End of [Heidegger's handwritten) manuscript.