History of the Concept of Time

Contents

TRANSLATOR'S FOREWARD

Introduction The Theme and Method of the Lecture Course

§ 1. Nature and history as domains of objects for the sciences

§ 2. Prolegomena to a phenomenology of history and nature under the guidance of the history of the concept of time

§ 3. Outline of the lecture course

PRELIMINARY PART

The Sense and Task of Phenomenological Research

§ 4. The situation of philosophy in the second half of the 19th century. Philosophy and the sciences

a) The position of positivism

b) Neo-Kantianism—the rediscovery of Kant in the philosophy of science

c) Critique of positivism—Dilthey's call for an independent method for the human sciences

d) The trivializing of Dilthey's inquiry by Windelband and Rickert

e) Philosophy as 'scientific philosophy'—psychology as the basic science of philosophy (the theory of consciousness)

α) Franz Brentano

β) Edmund Husserl

§ 5. Intentionality

a) Intentionality as the structure of lived experiences: exposition and initial elucidation

b) Rickert's misunderstanding of phenomenology and intentionality

c) The basic constitution of intentionality as such

α) The perceived of perceiving: the entity in itself (environmental thing, natural thing, thinghood)

β) The perceived of perceiving: the how of being-intended (the perceivedness of the entity, the feature of bodily-there)

γ) Initial indication of the basic mode of intentionality as the belonging-together of intentio and intentum

§ 6. Categorial intuition

a) Intentional presuming and intentional fulfillment

α) Identification as demonstrative fulfillment

β) Evidence as identifying fulfillment

γ) Truth as demonstrative identification

δ) Truth and being

b) Intuition and expression

α) Expression of perceptions

β) Simple and multi-level acts

c) Acts of synthesis

d) Acts of ideation

α) Averting misunderstandings

β) The significance of this discovery

§ 7. The original sense of the apriori

§ 8. The principle of phenomenology

a) The meaning of the maxim "to the matters themselves"

b) Phenomenology's understanding of itself as analytic description of intentionality in its apriori

§ 9. Clarification of the name 'phenomenology'

a) Clarification of the original sense of the component parts of the name

α) The original sense of φαινόμενον

β) Original sense of λόγος (λόγος ἀποφαντικός and λόγος σημαντικός)

b) Definition of the unified meaning thus obtained and the research corresponding to it

c) Correcting a few typical misunderstandings of phenomenology which stem from its name

§ 10. Elaboration of the thematic field: the fundamental determination of intentionality

a) Explication of the demarcation of the thematic field of phenomenology and fixation of the working horizons in Husserl and Scheler

b) Fundamental reflection upon the regional structure of the field in its originality: elaboration of pure consciousness as an independent region of being

§ 11. Immanent critique of phenomenological research: critical discussion of the four determinations of pure consciousness

a) Consciousness is immanent being

b) Consciousness is absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness

c) Consciousness is absolutely given in the sense of 'nulla re indiget ad existendum'

d) Consciousness is pure being

§ 12. Exposition of the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional as the basic field of phenomenological research

§ 13. Exposition of the neglect of the question of the sense of being itself and of the being of man in phenomenology

a) The necessary demarcation of phenomenology from naturalistic psychology, and its overcoming

b) Dilthey's endeavor of a 'personalistic psychology'—his idea of man as a person

c) Husserl's adoption of the personalistic tendency in the "Logos-Essay"

d) Fundamental critique of personalistic psychology on a phenomenological basis

e) Scheler's unsuccessful attempt in determining the mode of the being of acts and of the performer of acts

f) Result of the critical reflection: the neglect of the question of being as such and of the being of the intentional is grounded in the fallen ness of Dasein itself

MAIN PART

Analysis of the Phenomenon of Time and Derivation of the Concept of Time

FIRST DIVISION

Preparatory Description of the Field in Which the Phenomenon of Time Becomes Manifest

§ 14. Exposition of the question of being from the radically understood sense of the phenomenological principle

a) Assumption of the tradition as a genuine repetition

b)

c)

§ 15. Emergence of the question of being from an indeterminate preunderstanding of Dasein—question of being and understanding of being

§ 16. Interrogative structure of the question of being

§ 17. Correlation of the question of being and the questioning entity (Dasein)

§ 18. Acquisition of the fundamental structures of the basic constitution of Dasein

a) The Dasein is in the 'to be it at its time'

b) The Dasein in the 'to be' of everydayness for its particular while

§ 19. The basic constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The in-being of Dasein and the being-in of things on hand

§ 20. Knowing as a derivative mode of the in-being of Dasein

§ 21. Worldhood of the world

a) World hood as the wherein for Dasein's leeway of encounter

b) World hood of the environing world: aroundness, the primary character of the space of the "around" as constitutive of world hood

§ 22. How the tradition passed over the question of the worldhood of the world. Descartes as an example

§ 23. Positive exposition of the basic structure of the worldhood of the world

a) Analysis of the characters of encounter of the world (reference, referential totality, familiarity, 'one')

b) Interpretation of the structure of encounter of the environing world: the phenomenal correlation founding the characters of encounter themselves

α) The work-world: more detailed phenomenological interpretation of the environing world of concern

β) Characterization of the specific function of encounter of this work-world for encountering the nearest things in the environing world- the specific character of reality of the handy

γ) The specific function of encounter of the work-world for letting us encounter that which is always already there—the extant on hand

c) Determination of the basic structure of world hood as meaningfulness

α) Misinterpretation of the phenomenon of reference as substance and function

β) Sense of the structure of encounter belonging to world as meaningfulness

γ) Interconnection of the phenomena of meaningfulness, sign, reference, and relation

δ) Being-in-the-world, as concerned and understanding, discloses the world as meaningfulness

§ 24. Internal structuring of the question of the reality of the external world

a) The reality of the external world is exempt from any proof of it or belief in it

b) The reality of the real (worldhood of the world) cannot be defined on the basis of its being an object and being apprehended

c) Reality is not interpreted by way of the in-itself; rather, this character is itself in need of interpretation

d) Reality is not to be understood primarily in terms of the bodily presence of the perceived

e) Reality is not adequately clarified by the phenomenon of resistance as the object of drive and effort

§ 25. Spatiality of the world

a) Highlighting of the phenomenal structure of around ness as such is constituted by: remotion, region, orientation (directionality)

b) The primary spatiality of Dasein itself: remotion, region, orientation are determinations of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world

c) Spatializing the environing world and its space—space and extension in mathematical determination using Leibniz as an example

§ 26. The 'who' of being-in-the-world

a) Dasein as being-with—the being of others as co-Dasein (critique of the thematic of empathy)

b) The Anyone as the who of the being of with-one-another in everydayness

§ 27. In-being and care—an outline

§ 28. The phenomenon of discoveredness

a) Structure of the discoveredness of Dasein in its world: disposition

b) Understanding: the enactment of the being of discoveredness

c) The cultivation of understanding in interpretation

d) Discourse and language

α) Discoursing and hearing

β) Discoursing and silence

γ) Discoursing and idle talk

δ) Discourse and language

§ 29. Falling as a basic movement of Dasein

a) Idle talk

b) Curiosity

c) Ambiguity

d) The characters of the inherent movement of falling

e) The fundamental structures of Dasein from the horizon of fallenness

§ 30. The structure of uncanniness

a) The phenomenon of flight and fear

α) Fear as being afraid of something considered in its four essential moments

β) The modifications of fear

γ) Fear in the sense of fearing about

b) Dread and uncanniness

c) More original explication of falling and dread (uncanniness) as a preview of the basic constitution of Dasein as care

§ 31. Care as the being of Dasein

a) Determination of the articulated structure of care

b) The phenomena of urge and propensity

c) Care and discoveredness

d) Care and the character of the 'before' in understanding and interpretation (prepossession, preview, preconception)

e) The 'Fable of Cura' as an illustration of an original self-interpretation of Dasein

f) Care and intentionality

SECOND DIVISION

The Exposition of Time Itself

§ 32. The result and the task of the fundamental analysis of Dasein: elaboration of the question of being itself

§ 33. Necessity for the thematic development of the phenomenological interpretation of Dasein as a whole. The phenomenon of death

§ 34. Phenomenological interpretation of death as a phenomenon of Dasein

a) The utmost possibility of death in the mode of being of everydayness

b) The authentic relationship of the being of Dasein toward death

§ 35. The phenomenon of willing to have a conscience and of being guilty

§ 36. Time as the being in which Dasein can be its totality

EDITOR'S EPILOGUE

GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS

History of the Concept of Time (GA 20) [GA App]

Ereignis