arises in respect of a situation which has already been mentioned. That situation is of course difficult to keep in mind, because it is so simple. But it comes closer to us just as soon as we pay heed to the following: In the interpretation of belonging together as belonging together we, taking Parmenides' hint, already had in mind thinking as well as Being, and thus what belongs to each other in the Same.

When we understand thinking to be the distinctive characteristic of man, we remind ourselves of a belonging together that concerns man and Being. Immediately we find ourselves grappling with the questions: What does Being mean? Who, or what, is man? Everybody can see easily that without a sufficient answer to these questions we lack the foundation for determining anything reliable about the belonging together of man and Being. But as long as we ask our questions in this way, we are confined within the attempt to represent the "together" of man and Being as a coordination, and to establish and explain this coordination either in terms of man or in terms of Being. In this procedure, the traditional concepts of man and Being constitute the toe-hold for the coordination of the two.

How would it be if, instead of tenaciously representing merely a coordination of the two in order to produce their unity, we were for once to note whether and how a belonging to one another first

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