rigorous in its constancy, only if the same matter becomes for it ever more sharply contested. In this way the matter requires thinking to stay with it in its own manner of being, to remain steadfast toward that manner of being, answering to it by sustaining the matter to its completion. If its matter is Being, the thinking which stays with its matter must involve itself in the perdurance of Being. Accordingly, in a conversation with Hegel we are expected to clarify in advance the sameness of the same matter for the sake of that conversation. According to what has been said, we are required in our conversation with the history of philosophy to elucidate the otherness of the historical at the same time as we elucidate the otherness of the matter of thinking. Such a clarification must of necessity turn out to be short and sketchy.

In order to clarify the diversity that prevails between Hegel's thinking and our own attempt at thinking, we shall note three things.

We shall ask,

1. What is the matter of thinking for Hegel, and what is it for us?
2. What is the criterion for the conversation with the history of thinking for Hegel, and what is it for us?
3. What is the character of this conversation for Hegel, and what is it for us?

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