by metaphysics in its own way, as the result of representational thinking.
Thus the step back would itself remain unaccomplished, and the path which it opens and points out would remain untrod.
Such reflections impose themselves easily, but they carry no weight compared with an entirely different difficulty through which the step back must pass.
That difficulty lies in language. Our Western languages are languages of metaphysical thinking, each in its own way. It must remain an open question whether the nature of Western languages is in itself marked with the exclusive brand of metaphysics, and thus marked permanently by onto-theo-logic, or whether these languages offer other possibilities of utterance—and that means at the same time of a telling silence. The difficulty to which thoughtful utterance is subject has appeared often enough in the course of this seminar. The little word "is," which speaks everywhere in our language, and tells of Being even where It does not appear expressly, contains the whole destiny of Being—from the ἕστιν γὰρ εἶναιof Parmenides to the "is" of Hegel's speculative sentence, and to the dissolution of the "is" in the positing of the Will to Power with Nietzsche.
Our facing this difficulty that stems from language should keep us from hastily recasting the language of the thinking here at-