only color, hearing always uncovers only sound. 2. κοινόν.25 There are characteristic ways of being that are not fitted to one specific manner of perceiving, e.g., κίνησις [change]. 3. συμβεβηκὸς is what is regularly perceived (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός [something perceptible is said to be incidentally at hand, for instance, if the white thing were Diaeres' son]26). For, as a rule, I do not see color, I do not hear sounds, but instead the singer's song, something that is encountered along with the immediate perceiving [das im nächsten Veρνehmen Mitbegegnende]. When it comes to the perceptibility of something κατά συμβεβηκός deception is possible and even the rule.
Aristotle determined color, among other things, to be an ἴδιον.27 Daylight is the presence of fire.28 Daylight does not move. Only the sun moves, the presence of which is the daylight. Whoever says that daylight moves is speaking παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα,29 he is speaking past what shows itself. Φαινόμενον is what shows itself of itself to be of a certain sort and is immediately here as such. Speaking in a Kantian fashion, daylight is the condition of the possibility of the perceptibility of color. Precisely in this Kantian use of language, one can recognize the difference between what, in both cases, is understood by "condition." This is not to say, however, that Aristotle and Kant should be contrasted with one another as realists and idealists (there is no such contrast in Greek philosophy). What does "condition of the possibility of the perceptibility of color" mean, what does "being a condition" mean for Aristotle? Color is seen in daylight. The thing seen must be at daytime. Daylight is something that is part of the being of the world itself. Daylight is the sun's presence. The character of being for this manner of being-present is to let things be seen through it. Letting something be seen is the sun's manner of being. The perceptibility of things is subject to a condition, that of a specific manner of being of this world itself. "Being a condition" applies to a manner of being of the world itself. The sun's being on hand, precisely <ι>whatι> we mean when we determine: it is daytime, is part of the existence in the world. By this means we speak of a fact of the matter that is part of the being of the world itself. The result of this is that φαινόμενον initially means nothing other than a distinctive manner of an entity's presence.
25. Op. cit., Beta 6, 418a17ff.
26. Op. cit., Beta 6, 418a20f.
27. On this matter, see the Appendix, Supplement 2 (p. 223).
28. Aristotle, De anima, B 7, 418b16.
29. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b24.