things are]. 5. Utrum praeter primam aliqua alia veritas sit aeterna [Whether besides the first truth some other truth is eternal]. 6. Utrum veritas creata sit immutabilis [Whether created truth is immutable]. 7. Utrum veritas in divinis personaliter vel essentialiter dicatur [Whether the truth in regard to divinity is said personally or essentially]. (Whether truth's being in God must be grasped in the sense of belonging to God's being or to God's being-a-person, insofar, namely, as the truth has a genuine connection with the inner divine life.) 8. Utrum omnis veritas sit a prima veritate [Whether every truth is from the first truth]. 9. Utrum veritas sit in sensu [Whether truth is in a sense]. 10. Utrum res aliqua sit falsa [Whether any thing is false]. 11. Utrum falsitas sit in sensu [Whether falsity is in a sense]. 12. Utrum in intellectu sit falsitas [Whether falsity may be in the intellect].
We will take up only a few pieces of the account and attempt to interpret them. For the comprehension of the entire doctrine of being-true and truth in Thomas, it is important to become clear about the connection in which the discussion of being-true and truth is presented. The first article provides some information about this. Thomas proceeds from a methodological consideration: Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens [Whence it is necessary that all other conceptions of the intellect are taken up by way of an addition to being).2 Every explanation of what something is must come to the formal determination ens in such a way that one acquires the concrete determinations of an object through an addere [adding]. What is verum [the true]? It is established that verum is an ens [a being]. Accordingly, we have to ask: In what connection with the ens does the concrete determinacy of verum stand? Can the connection with the ens be construed in the sense that the verum is a determination of the ens, in the manner of an affectio [affection]? No. Thomas: since being-true is no thing and no thing-like property, it needs to be asked: What relation does the verum have to the ens? The verum is a modus of the ens. The entire discussion of the being of being-true, with regard to being itself, proceeds in this direction. With relation to the ens, the verum esse [to be true] is to be grasped as a mode.
Thomas distinguishes two modi in which being can be determined at all. Quite apart from the verum, he begins the explication completely in the manner of formal ontology. It is important to see in what place the verum esse comes up. He first distinguishes two modi: 1. modus specialis, 2. modus generalis. Modus specialis is linked to the manner in which the Aristotelian categories are connected with οὐσία. Various modi speciales essendi [special modes of being] thereby present themselves. The being of the verum cannot fall under this connection, since it will prove to be a relativum.
2. Op. cit., Quaestio I, Articulus I [Question 1, article 1. Hereafter: q. 1, art. 1].