The modus generalis can be taken in two directions: 1. considered in se [in itself], 2. in ordine ad aliud [in relation to another]. Insofar as ens is considered in itself and, indeed, affirmatively, the determination of it as res results; insofar as it is considered negatively, the determination of it as unum results. Ens is, in a negative respect, the sort of being that is characterized by indivisibility. Omne ens considered per se is res and unum [Every being considered in terms of itself is a thing and one].
Insofar as being is considered in the modus generalis in ordine ad aliud [in relation to something else], it is an aliud quid [different] or aliquid [something else], it is something and not an another. Insofar as an ens is considered secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud [in terms of an agreement of one being with another], what results is ens as bonum or verum [a being as good or true]. The possibility of the verum's being first surfaces at this juncture.
How are the esse creatum [to be created] and the esse perceptum [to be perceived] connected with one another? Is it possible to find a basis of ontological determinations from which these two characters of being sprout? And is it possible to determine the manner of considering being that leads to the elevation of these two characters of being out of the ground [Boden] of entities? We will answer the question of the motivational connection between the esse creatum and the esse perceptum by showing that both the esse as esse perceptum and the esse as esse creatum lead us back to an esse verum, an esse verum that presents us with the task of determining its being. In order to orient ourselves more easily, the course of the interpretation of the falsum and error, conducted so far, may be briefly given again. We have set this interpretation in motion in order to get a glimpse of the verum. Both modi essendi with respect to the idea are uniformly conceived as the esse in the sense of the cogitatio or, better, of the realm of the cogitationes, the res cogitans. The esse of the res cogitans is clare et distincte perceptum esse [the "to be of the thinking thing" is "to be perceived clearly and distinctly"], perceptum esse equals verum esse ["to be perceived" equals "to be true"]. The peculiar character that emerged in this consideration is that a peculiar reduction [Nivellierung] of being presents itself within the res cogitans, insofar as the perceptum esse pertains not only to the cogitatum [the what is thought], but also to the cogitare [the thinking]. The esse perceptum is the genuine esse verum that pertains to both possibilities of the res cogitans as such. The res cogitans is, therefore, 1. being in the sense of the esse perceptum. 2. Error is a privatio [privation] and, as privation, a non esse [nonbeing], not a non esse as nihil [not a nonbeing as nothing], but a non esse entis [a nonbeing of an entity]. The character of the "non" [not] is the usus voluntatis non rectus' [incorrect use of the will]. The "not-character" pertains to a rectitudo [correctness]. Non rectus [not correct] means: deficiens a rectitudine, i.e., a