than the sense of individuality used in formal logic. It is this indivisio that I encounter if I conceive the ens in se negatively, and the categorial expression for this indivisio is unum. Orone ens est unum [Every being is one].
Also in regard to the ordo ad aliud there is a twofold possibility: 1. secundum divisionem unius ab altero [according to the division of one from another], insofar as I distinguish the one from the other, et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid; dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid,7 each res qua ens in ordine ad aliud is an aliquid [and the term something expresses this, for something is called, as it were, another what, each thing qua being in relation to another is a something]. Each entity qua entity is aliquid, aliud-quid [something, some other what], an other and not the one.
[U]nde sicut ens dicitur unum, inquantum est indivisum in se; ita dicitur aliquid, inquantum est ab allis divisum.8
[Whence just as being is called one insofar as it is undivided in itself, so it is called something insofar as it is divided from others.]
The divisio [division] itself provides these two aspects: indivisum in se: unum; divisum ab altero: aliquid [undivided in itself: one; divided from another: something]. In its scientific niveau this explication even moves beyond Aristotle. 2. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud [In another way, according to the agreement of one entity with another].9 The second factor presents itself if I consider an entity secundum convenientiam ad aliud [according to agreement with something else]. This convenientia [agreement] introduces an entirely new determination. It is formally given, but it brings us into concrete relations. Convenientia is the type and manner of agreeing, of coming together, of coinciding in some sense. This determination non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente [This determination is impossible unless something is considered that naturally comes together with every being].10 There is such an esse [to be] in the sense of convenientia [coming together] only if there is an entity whose genuine being is inherently such as convenire cum omni ente [to come together with every being]. Is there such an entity that agrees with every entity? Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia [This, however, is the soul that, in a way, is all things].11 This connection of the unum ens [one being] with all entities as a whole can only be made intelligible insofar as the convenire is