Introduction to Phenomenological Research

inherent in the being of this aliquid [this something]. The source of this determination lies in Aristotle's De anima (III, 8, 431b21f.): ἡ ψυχή τά ὄντα πώς ἔστιν πάντα γὰρ ἢ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά.11 Every entity is conceivable either in the sense of being perceived through the senses or in the sense of νοεῖν [thinking]. Insofar as each entity is perceivable by the soul, the soul is in a certain sense everything; it is what it is in discovering and possessing, in having every entity. Thomas affirms this proposition of Aristotle now not only for the νόησις and αἴσθησις but principally for every virtus [power] of the anima [soul] itself. In the anima there is the grasping capacity (intellectus) and the striving (voluntas). Bonum est quod omnia appetunt [The good is what all things desire]. Convenientiam vera entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum [The term "true" expresses an entity's truly coming together with the intellect].13 Verum is a modus essendi [the true is a mode of being], indeed, such that the ens that is considered here ad omnia [for all] has the soul's character of being. You notice that in this entire explication we have yet to encounter anything concretely objective. Now, in the course of the determination of convenientia as a modus essendi, the introduction of a concrete manner of being appears, a manner of being that on the basis of its φύσις is suited to convenire cum omni ente [to come together with every being], the very manner of being that is conceived as the coming together of the accord unius entis ad aliud [the accord of one being with another]. Being-true is a manner of being in the sense of a definite being-together of two entities. Here it becomes possible to see how the verum is brought into the framework of fundamental determinations of being and how, on the basis of this placement, the verum is constituted fundamentally in view of the formal dimension of esse in ordine ad aliud [being in relation to something else].

§ 30. The genuine being of the verum as convenientia in intellectus (De veritate, q. 1, art. 1-3)

What, then, is the primordial being of verum and what constitutes the primordial being of verum? Insofar as verum is convenientia, the question arises: Is the verum the convenire [the coming together, the agreeing] or does verum have its genuine being in the anima or in the res cum qua anima convenit [in the soul or in the thing with which the soul agrees]?

The sense of verum is divided up into three basic determinations. 1. The verum is founded in the res with which tlle soul has an accord; 2. id quod formaliter rationem veri perficit [that which formally perfects the meaning of

12. Aristotle, De anima, Gamma 8, 431b2lf.

13. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1, art. 1.