is in a certain way the universe. For this reason, Leibniz designates the monad mundus concentratus.
Every monad as such individuates itself; every monad is in each case independently “formative” of the whole. Dasein too, human beings, are conceived as monads. Being formative of their own accord, they essentially have no need to receive; in their essence, there lies no receptivity from the outside. Monads have no windows, because they do not need them; they do not need them, because they have everything within themselves, are entirely closed, not open. They need no commerce, no relation to others; rather, the whole is in each case within all, and all are as entia creata by way of the whole in the sense of the supreme monad. It is “empathy,” however, that gives the monad windows; empathy indeed is, as it were, the window.
By contrast, our interpretation agrees with Leibniz in this: the monad, Dasein, has no windows, because it needs none. But the reason is different: human beings need no windows, not because they have no need to go out, but because they are essentially already outside. This reason, however, is indicative of a totally different determination of the essence of the subject. The task is not to supplement the monadological approach and improve it by way of empathy but to radicalize it.
§20. Community on the grounds of the with-one-another
On the grounds of the with-one-another, community becomes possible, but the with-one-another is not first constituted by a community of Is. “Constitution” of the with-one-another is ambiguous, as the concept of constitution readily becomes: (a) the concept means, as in Neo-Kantianism, construction in the sense of letting something arise out of simple, though indeed not psychological, elements; then, here at least, it becomes nonsensical; (b) the concept means the demonstration of an essential construction that is in itself always already whole and indivisible; then, it is legitimate, yet certainly must be grounded in its methodological character. The with-one-another as something elementary is not to be derived but must presumably be elucidated with respect to the constituents belonging to its essence, which are all equiprimordial. Within this constitution belonging to the essence of each individual Dasein, there is no place for “empathy.” For if this word is meant to have any meaning left at all, then this can be only on the grounds of the presupposition that the “I” can indeed initially be within its own ego-sphere and must from there then enter into the other and its sphere. Because it is already outside, the “I” neither first breaks out of itself (out of its window) nor breaks into the other, because it already encounters itself outside together with this other and does so there precisely in a genuine sense, as can be shown.