The Restriction of Being • 119

τίς γὰρ τίς ἀνὴρ πλέον

τᾶς εὐδαιμονίας φέρει

ἢ τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν

καὶ δόξαντ’ ἀποκλῖναι;


Who then, which man, bears more

controlled and fitting Dasein

than what suffices to stand in seeming

in order then—as one who seems—to decline? (namely, from standing-there-straight-in-himself)13


In clarifying the essence of the infinitive, we spoke of certain words that display an ἔγκλισις, a de-clining, falling over (casus). Now we see that seeming, as a variant of Being itself, is the same as falling over. It is a variant of Being in the sense of standing-there-straight-in-itself. Both deviations from Being are determined by [83|116] Being as the constancy of standing-in-the-light, that is, of appearing.

It should now be clearer that seeming belongs to Being itself as appearing. Being as seeming is no less powerful than Being as unconcealment. Seeming happens in and with beings themselves. But seeming not only lets beings appear as what they really are not, it not only distorts the beings whose seeming it is; in all this it also covers itself over as seeming, inasmuch as it shows itself as Being. Because seeming essentially distorts itself in covering-over and distortion, we rightly say that appearances are deceiving.14 This deception is part of seeming itself. Only because seeming itself deceives can it trick human beings and lead them into delusion.


13. A more conventional translation would be: “Who then, which man / has more happiness / than what suffices to seem / and, in seeming, to decline?”

14. The German idiom is der Schein trügt, or “seeming deceives.”


Introduction to Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (GA 40) by Martin Heidegger

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