Seen in this way, becoming is a seeming of Being.

In the inceptive disclosure of the Being of beings, then, becoming, as well as seeming, must be opposed to Being. Yet becoming as “arising” nevertheless belongs to φύσις. If we understand both in a Greek manner, becoming as coming-into-presence and going-away out of presence, Being as emergent and appearing coming to presence, not-Being as absence, then the reciprocal relation between emerging and waning is appearance, [88|123] Being itself. Just as becoming is the seeming of Being, seeming as appearing is the becoming of Being.

This already lets us see that it will not do simply to reduce the separation between Being and seeming to that between Being and becoming, or vice versa. So the question of the relationship between these two separations must remain open for now. The answer will depend on the originality, breadth, and solidity of the grounding of that within which the Being of beings essentially unfolds. And philosophy, in its inception, did not tie itself down to particular propositions. It is true that the subsequent accounts of its history give this impression, for these accounts are doxographical, that is, they describe the opinions and views of the great thinkers. But whoever eavesdrops on the great thinkers and ransacks them for views and standpoints can be sure of making a false move and taking a false step, even before he has derived any result, that is, the formula or the slogan for a philosophy. The thinking and the Dasein of the Greeks struggles over a decision between the great powers of Being and becoming, Being and seeming. This setting-asunder had to develop the relationship between thinking and Being into a definite form. This implies that the formation of the third separation is already being prepared among the Greeks.