134 • The Restriction of Being

Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel.

Logic, as the exhibition of the formal structure of thinking and the exposition of its rules, was first able to develop after the separation between Being and thinking had already been carried out, [93|129] and carried out in a definite way and in a special respect. Hence, neither logic itself nor its history can ever sufficiently clarify the essence and origin of this separation between Being and thinking. For its part, logic is in need of clarification and grounding as regards its own origin and the rightfulness of its claim to supply the definitive interpretation of thinking. The historical provenance of logic as an academic discipline and the particulars of its development do not concern us here. However, we must reflect on the following questions:

1. Why could something like “logic” come about in the Platonic school, and why did it have to come about?

2. Why was this doctrine of thinking a doctrine of λόγος in the sense of assertion?

3. What are the grounds for the position of power held by the logical, a position of power that progressively and constantly expands until it finally expresses itself in the following proposition of Hegel? “The logical (is) the absolute form of truth and, what is more, it is also pure truth itself” (Encyclopedia §19, WW vol. VI, 29).26 In keeping with this position of power held by the “logical,” Hegel deliberately calls “logic” the doctrine otherwise generally called “metaphysics.” His “science of logic” has nothing to do with a textbook on logic in the usual style.

Thinking is called intelligere in Latin. It is the business of the intellectus. If we are struggling against intellectualism, then in order actually to struggle, we must know our opponent:

26. Heidegger cites Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1834–54).

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