4. How does λόγος (the “logical”) become the essence of thinking?
5. How does this λόγος, as reason and understanding, come to rule over Being in the inception of Greek philosophy?
In accordance with the six guiding principles proposed earlier (see pages 103–4 above), we will again follow this separation in its historical origin, which also means its essential origin. Here we insist that the disjunction between Being and thinking, if it is an inner and necessary disjunction, must be founded on an original belonging of what is separated. Thus, our question about the origin of the separation is also and already the question about the essential belonging of thinking to Being.
Asked historically, the question runs: how does it stand with this belonging in the decisive inception of Western philosophy? How is thinking understood at its beginning? That the Greek doctrine of thinking becomes a doctrine of λόγος, “logic,” can provide us with an indication. In fact, we find an original connection between Being, φύσις, and λόγος. We just have to free ourselves from the opinion that λόγος and λέγειν originally and authentically mean thinking, understanding, and reason. As long as we hold to this opinion, and even interpret λόγος using the later conception of λόγος as logic as our criterion, our new disclosure of the inception of Greek philosophy will lead only to absurdities. Furthermore, this conception will never give us any insight into 1) why λόγος could be separated from the Being of beings at all, and 2) why this λόγος had to determine the essence of thinking and bring thinking into opposition to Being. [95|132]
Let us go straight to the decisive point and ask: what do λόγος and λέγειν mean, if they do not mean thinking? Λόγος means the word, discourse, and λέγειν means to discourse, to talk. Dia-logue is reciprocal discourse, mono-logue is solitary discourse. But λόγος does not originally mean discourse, or saying.