186 • The Restriction of Being

What we still need in order to prove our assertion in general is this. We already indicated how in apprehending, as the taking up that takes in,72 beings as such are disclosed, and thus come forth into unconcealment. For the poet, the assault of τέχνη against δίκη is the happening through which human beings become homeless. When one is put out of the home in this way, the home first discloses itself as such. But at the same time, and only in this way, the alienating first discloses itself, the overwhelming as such. In the happening of uncanniness, beings as a whole open themselves up. This opening up is the happening of unconcealment. This is nothing other than the happening of uncanniness. [128|176]

Certainly, one will object, this applies to what the poet is saying. But what we cannot find in the sober saying of Parmenides is what has been characterized as uncanniness.

So now we must show the sobriety of thinking in its true light. We will do so through the detailed interpretation of the saying. We say in advance: if we should show that apprehending, in its belonging-together with Being (δίκη), is such that it uses violence, and as doing violence is an urgent need, and as an urgent need is undergone only in the necessity of a struggle [in the sense of πόλεμος and ἔρις <confrontation and strife>],73 and if in addition we should demonstrate that apprehending stands explicitly in connection with logos, and this logos proves to be the ground of human Being, then our assertion that there is an inner affinity between the thoughtful saying and the poetic saying will have been grounded.

We will show three things:

72. “… in der Vernehmung als dem hin-nehmenden Vor-nehmen.”

73. In parentheses in the 1953 edition.

Introduction to Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (GA 40) by Martin Heidegger

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