but makes apprehending into the apprehending that gathers. In order to remain gathered, therefore, λέγειν must turn away from all mere recitation, from glibness and the ready tongue. And so we find in Parmenides the sharp opposition between λόγος and γλῶσσα <tongue> (fragment 7, lines 3ff.). The passage corresponds to the beginning of fragment 6, where in relation to taking the first, unavoidable way to Being, it is said that it is needful to gather oneself to the Being of the being. Now <in fragment 7> we are dealing with the directive for traveling the third way, into seeming. This way leads through what is, which also always stands in semblance. This way is the customary way. Hence, the man who knows must constantly tear himself away from this way into the λέγειν and νοεῖν of the Being of the being:

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and by no means shall habit, ever so sly, force you in this way’s direction,

so that you lose yourself in unseeing gaping and in clamorous hearing

and in the ready tongue, but instead decide incisively, as gathered into one you set down before yourself the exposition of the manifold conflict,

the exposition provided by me.⁸⁰

Here λόγος stands in the most intimate bond with κρίνειν, cutting as de-ciding, in carrying out the gathering to the gatheredness of Being. Selective “gleaning” <das auslesende “Lesen”> grounds and sustains the pursuit of Being and the rejection of seeming.

80. Conventional translation: “… but instead judge by reason the much-contested argument / provided by me.” Heidegger’s innovation here, among other things, is to render logo¯i as “gathered into one” rather than “by reason.”