The meaning of κρίνειν includes: to select, to bring into relief, to set the measure that determines rank.

These three points carry the interpretation of the saying far enough to make it clear that Parmenides, too, in fact deals with logos in essential respects. Logos is an urgent need, and in itself needs to use violence in order to fend off glibness and dispersion. Logos as λέγειν stands against φύσις. In this disjunction, logos as the happening of gathering becomes the ground that grounds Being-human. Thus we were able to claim that in the saying, the decisive determination of the human essence is first fulfilled. To be human means to gather, to gather and apprehend the Being of beings, to take over the knowing setting-into-work of appearance and thus to steward unconcealment, to preserve it against concealment and covering-up.

Thus, in the inception of Western philosophy, it is already clear that the question of Being necessarily includes the grounding of Dasein.

We can no more grasp this connection between Being and Dasein (and the corresponding question about it) by appeal to epistemological problems than we can grasp it by ascertaining, by external means, that every conception of Being depends on a conception of Dasein. [If indeed the question about Being seeks not only the Being of beings, but Being itself in its essence, then what is fully and explicitly required is a grounding of Dasein that is guided by this question, a grounding that therefore, and only therefore, gave itself the name “fundamental ontology.” See Being and Time, introduction.]⁸¹

We say that this inceptive opening up of the essence of Being-human was decisive. Yet it was not preserved and maintained as the great inception. This opening up had an entirely different consequence:

81. In parentheses in 1953 edition.