is always at the same time the strife against concealment, covering-up, against seeming.

Seeming, δόξα, is not something external to Being and unconcealment, but instead belongs to unconcealment. But δόξα is also ambiguous in itself. On the one hand, it means the view in which something proffers itself, and on the other hand it means the view that human beings have. Dasein settles into such views. They are asserted and passed on. Thus, δόξα is a type of logos. The dominant views now obstruct our own view of beings. Beings are deprived of the possibility of turning themselves toward apprehending, appearing on their own right. The view granted by beings, which usually turns itself toward us, is distorted into a view upon beings. The dominance of views thus distorts beings and twists them.

“To twist a thing” is called ψεύδεσθαι by the Greeks. The struggle for the unconcealment of beings, ἀλήθεια, thus becomes the struggle against the ψεῦδος, against twisting and distortion. But the essence of struggle implies that the one who struggles becomes dependent on his opponent, whether he conquers him or is defeated by him. So because the struggle against untruth [147|201] is a struggle against the ψεῦδος, then the struggle for truth, in contrast to the ψεῦδος against which one is struggling, becomes the struggle for the ἀ-ψευδές, the undistorted, the untwisted.

With this, the originary experience of truth as unconcealment is endangered. For the undistorted is reached only when apprehending and comprehending turn to beings without twisting, straight on—that is, when apprehending and comprehending are directed by beings. The way to truth as correctness lies open.

This happening of the transformation of unconcealment, by way of distortion, to undistortedness and from this to correctness, must be seen together with the transformation of φύσις into ἰδέα, of λόγος as gathering into λόγος as assertion.