Here we immediately recall the schema of the separations that are in question:

What stands over against becoming as its contradiction is continuous endurance. What stands over against seeming as mere semblance is what is really viewed, the ἰδέα. As the ὄντως ὄν <what really is>, the ἰδέα is furthermore what endures continuously, as opposed to mutable seeming. But becoming and seeming are not determined only by οὐσία; for οὐσία, in turn, is still definitively determined by its connection to logos, judgment as assertion, διάνοια. Accordingly, becoming and seeming are also determined by the perspective of thinking.

From the point of view of the thinking that makes judgments, which always starts from something that endures, becoming appears as not-enduring. Not-enduring shows itself at first, within what is present at hand, as not staying in the same place. Becoming appears as change of place, φορά, local motion. Change [149|204] of place becomes the definitive phenomenon of motion, in the light of which all becoming is then to be comprehended. When the dominance of thinking comes to the fore, in the sense of modern mathematical rationalism, no other form of becoming whatsoever is recognized other than motion in the sense of change of place. Wherever other phenomena of motion show themselves, one attempts to grasp them on the basis of change of place. Change of place itself, motion, is for its part now conceived only in terms of velocity: c = s/t.¹¹¹ Descartes, the philosophical founder of this way of thinking,

111. That is, celeritas = spatium/tempus, or velocity = distance/time.