So this question as a whole <is> the attempt to unsettle the “distinction” and not the simple progression to the other side of the distinction! For the whole thrust goes from the understanding of Being to the happening of Being {Seinsgeschehnis}—thus the overcoming of the understanding of Being insofar as <this understanding is supposedly> decisive!

On the other hand, in this way one does take seriously what has been forgotten and unasked in the Platonic-Aristotelian- Kantian (P-A-K) fundamental position—the understanding of Being as a historical fact is ascertained and at the same time unsettled.

5. How far does the lecture course get?

From the word “Being” to its “meaning”—but only that this meaning is definite and that this definiteness stems from the collapse of the inception. But Being itself!

How to question there?

Only from Being itself (not from the understanding of Being), grounding this understanding as what is most questionable! Cf. p. 35 <= 88ff>. {GA 40: 219}

Cf. on the reworking of the presentation, distinctions that delimit Being against becoming, seeming, thinking, the ought— the disempowerment of φύσις, esp. pp. 5ff. <= 8ff.>.

The lecture course gets stuck halfway, not just because in its narrow way of posing the question it is not brought to an end—cf. projection! from the understanding of Being to the happening of Being! {Seinsgeschehnis} —but because at bottom it does not escape from the shackles of the understanding of Being. And it fails to do so because the question—even the fundamental question—in no way draws <us> into the essential, that is, into the essential unfolding of Being itself.

The explication of the concept of Being and its history is important—the fact of the understanding of Being and its