182     L. IRIGARAY

will enter into relation with other living beings by taking on a difference which undoes any a priori constitution of a totality of beings, including the one presupposed by « Being ».

There is no « Being » which can radically define the being of the living. The overman is the one who would be capable of questioning « how the Being of beings as a whole is determined » and « how it concerns man » (op.cit., p. 66; p. 89), in particular as a possible manifestation of a spirit of revenge. On whom and for what ought man to take more or less conscious revenge? Could it be for the fact of his having been conceived by two and the consequent partial nature of his own being and his role in conceiving ? What will could overcome such revenge? Does this possible origin of Being not arise from a lack of consideration for life itself, which, nevertheless, feeds it? Indeed, without any respect for life and the links tied between living beings with respect for their difference, the human will runs the risk of becoming the vengeful and deadly arrogance of a demiurge, who wants to decide on the being of all the living and on the links between them regardless of life itself.

Could the eternal return of the same express something of such a fatal advent? Indeed, life is extraneous to this sort of return; life becomes without ever being repeated, on pain of declining. The resentment of which Nietzsche speaks could thus be caused by life itself and its needs of a perpetual transformation, which makes it elusive as such—extraneous to any metaphysical way of conceiving of being.

The bridge allowing us to have access to another era of being consists in willing oneself and not willing something. However, this willing oneself calls for our adopting another logic, according to which being is not picked, put in front of oneself, represented, named and gathered with others. In the self-affection, in search of a willing oneself, almost nothing of this traditional logic remains. The foundation corresponding with such willing oneself could appear as a mere nothingness to the one who does not perceive or want anything concerning flesh. There is no doubt that the latter remains elusive with respect to all that has been defined as being in our traditional ontology, nevertheless it is. And the resentment against our will itself, as metaphysics conceived of it, could mean that it has destroyed flesh and its will to live, its will to develop, notably through uniting with another flesh.