oriented to Fundamental Ontology, the problematic of a laying of the ground for metaphysics was made more precise, even though it stops short of what is decisive. So there remains but one thing to do: to hold the investigation open by means of questions.
By extension, following the Transcendental Analytic, to the interpretation of which our investigation was restricted, is there not a "Transcendental Dialectic"? If at first this also can only be the critical application of the insight into the essence of Metaphysica Generalis which was attained with the rejection of the traditional Metaphysica Specialis, then is there not also a positive problematic to be found in this characterization of the Transcendental Dialectic, which appears to be only negative?
And what if this [positive problematic] is concentrated in the same question which, although concealed and not worked out, has already guided all the previous problematics of metaphysics, namely, the problem of the finitude of Dasein?
Kant says the "transcendental appearance," to which traditional metaphysics owes its possibility, was more necessary. Must not this transcendental untruth, with regard to its original unity with transcendental truth, come to be positively grounded on the basis of the innermost essence of the finitude in Dasein? Does the nonessence [Unwesen] of that appearance belong to this essence of finitude?
But then, does the problem of the "transcendental appearance" not reqUire a liberation from that architectonic into which Kant forced it—in accordance with his orientation to traditional logic—especially if, through the Kantian ground-laying, logic in general as possible ground and guide for the problematic of metaphysics has been shaken?
What is the transcendental essence of truth in general? How, particularly on the grounds of the finitude of Dasein, are this [essence of truth] and the nonessence of untruth, which were originally unified with man's basic neediness as a being who has been thrown into beings, to be compelled to understand something like Being?
Does it make sense, and is there a justification for grasping man on the grounds of his innermost finitude—that he requires "Ontology," i.e., understanding of Being—as "creative" and consequently as "infinite," where indeed there is nothing which even the idea of an infinite creature recoils from as radically as it does from an ontology?
At the same time, however, is it permissible to develop the finitude in Dasein only as a problem, without a "presupposed" infinitude? What in general is the nature of this "presupposing" in Dasein? What does the infinitude which is so "composed" mean?
Will the Question of Being, in all its elementary weight and breadth, free itself again from all this questionableness? Or have we already become so much the fools of the organization, of the hustle and bustle, that we are no