historical destiny of the categorial explication of the sense of facticity in its being. In φρόνησις life itself comes into play directly as the withwhich of the getting about.

But life here is not ontologically characterized positively but merely formally, as that which also can be otherwise and not that which always necessarily is. Its ontological characterization is performed by negating another being, authentic being, the "always necessarily is." This in turn is not explicated from the being of human life. Instead, its categorial structure is derived from a particular ontological radicalization of the idea of entities in motion which makes the movement of production exemplary. Being becomes the finished product, the being in which the movement has come to its end. The being of life is seen as a movement which takes its course within itself, in particular, when the human life has come to its end in its most distinctive possibility of movement, that of pure beholding. This movement is to be found in the ἕξις of σοφία. Such a pure understanding does not bring human life, whose being can also be otherwise, in the how of its factic being into troth. On the contrary, this being must now be regarded within the pure temporalization of σοφία in its orientation toward νοῦς, pure beholding. And νοῦς finds its genuine movement when it has foregone all outgoing orientations and simply beholds; it is the movement which, when It has come to Its end, not only does not cease but precisely then is movement.

As an underway toward, every movement is in its very sense something which has not yet reached its toward-which: learning, going, building. By contrast, having seen is contemporaneous with seeing. Something is beholden precisely in the beholding. Only the νόησις as pure θεωρεῖν is therefore adequate to the highest idea of pure movement. The authentic being of the human being is temporalized in the pure fulfillment of σοφία as the undisturbed leisurely lingering of pure beholding with the pure ἀρχαί of eternal entities. The being of ἕξις and ἀρετή, that is to say, the ontological structure of being human, thus becomes understood in terms of a particular movement and the ontological radicalization of this movement.

The overview accompanying the Einleitung concludes with a renewed gloss of the texts familiar to us from SS 1922: the opening chapters of the Metaphysics, with emphasis on the genesis of the theoretical from factic life; the opening books of the Physics on the manifold ways of expressing being in its motion. In book 2, for example (chaps. 4-6), Aristotle faces the problem of the "historical" movement of factic life under the headings of τύχη (chance, fortune) and αὐτόματον (a "self-moved" happening, thus "without cause," by chance), which Heidegger finds to be untranslatable terms in their Aristotelian usage. On the basis of the issues raised by these texts, especially the conflicting "archontic"