is ὑποκείμενον, what already lies there beforehand and is therefore "on hand," vorhanden, available. Then Aristotle lists the more subtle senses regarding beings which are "present in" (ἐνυπάρχοντα) the more everyday things: 2) the soul "in" the living body, 3) the parts defining the individual body, for example, its surface, "whose destruction bring about the destruction of the whole" (1017b19). The soul is not obviously there, but it must be there in order for something to be alive and in the world; likewise for the "essential" parts of a whole. The first comprehensive character of the "there" of οὐσία is now clear: the word itself suggests that it is but an abbreviation of παρουσία, presentness (Gegenwärtigkeit), the present. But a second dominant—one is tempted to say "equiprimordial"—character is already manifesting itself in and through this first: being finished, complete (thus ready and available). Aristotle's example of the surfaces which bound bodies, giving them their shape and form, is not a casual one: bodies assume de-finition, manifest their "finish" through the "look" of their surfaces. Aristotle's onto-logic of essential presences and co-presences is clearly the forerunner of those extreme thought-experiments out to test limits that are associated with Husserl's eidetic variation, in order to establish "that without which a thing cannot be what it is." Such a sense of reality is traceable back to the famous Greek respect for limits, bounds, perimeters, horizons, de-finition, that now manifests itself as a fundamental character of the There of beings.
The allusion to limiting presences which define individuality points to the second character of οὐσία: being finished, complete. Thus, the fourth sense of οὐσία listed in 5.8 is the true λόγος ὁρισμός, which is τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ("essence" is the usual translation, but Heidegger insists on the literal "what it was," something understood out of its origin), which is the οὐσία ἑκάστου, the being ("substance") of each thing in its particularity (1017b23) ... or so is each term usually translated. These defining limits, however, are not immediately evident in the everyday things, and so call for an "event of an unusual kind" to make them present. Temporal particularity (Jeweiligkeit = ἔκαστος) is neither "each" nor individual and certainly not "general," and yet, as γένος (genus), it is that in which and out of which I "while," circumscribed in its outermost here and now. It is not immediately and directly given-in fact, it disappears in the usualness of the everyday-but rather demands a certain distance (ἕκας) in order to become present. In this presence by distance, we are given an opportunity to see what is there in terms of where it comes from (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), in its provenance or "history," and how it has come to its limit (πέρας). Authentic presentness is to be found in the extremity (ἕσχατον: Metaphysics 5. 17) of a particular being, in its "finish," what it "was to be." Such ultimate aspects of being in the εἶδος (the silhouetted outlines of a "look," ergo a "form") and τέλος (end) receive their accounting in the