with day and night, protecting ourselves from the weather, making things out of its stuff. Environmentally encountered nature is in its "always already there" in fact distinctive in not needing immediate attention, not having to be produced. It is on hand, prepresent, first in its immediate availability rather than as an object of the natural sciences. Its on-handness (Vorhandenheit) in the form of immediate availability is tacit and referential, and so more comparable to the character of the to-handness of handy tools than to that of a mere object standing before a theoretical observer. The distinction between the two "handnesses" here is not as sharp as it will be in the next two drafts of BT.
This more subtle and richer presence-at-hand is lost in BT itself, when Heidegger restricts Vorhandenheit to the presence which has been denuded of a world, like obtrusively "striking" things, scientific objects, and what is traditionally known as "substance." But it still occurs on occasion in SS 1925 (GA 20:270), where Heidegger will moreover, by means of the Husserlian borrowing, "appresentation," try anew to bring out the rich and complex, albeit immediate, presence of the world in relation to its things ... and to Dasein itself.
2. Who is in the World?
The second question is directed toward Being-in-the-world: "how does 'Being' in a world appear?" (GA 63:85). In 1924, it is put more ontically as the question of "the entity that is in the world" and in SS 1925 more precisely and elaborately as the question of "the entity as defined by the 'who' of this Being-in-the-world and the how of this being, how the entity itself is in its being" (GA 20:211). Just as the first question took us to the most immediate presence of the world, so will the second to the most immediate presence of the "self" which is in-volved with such a world.
As being-in-the-world, Dasein is at once, "at the same time" (zugleich), being-with-one-another. And in the very first developed use of this term, Heidegger observes that these two characters of the being of Dasein, being-in-the-world and being-with-one-another, are "equiprimordial" (gleichursprunglich). The term will proliferate in BT, appearing there first in precisely the same context of the Self and Other (SZ 114). But in 1924 we have one of the rare contexts which also suggests the ultimate contemporaneity of all such primary characters. Heidegger used the term first in the habilitation of 1916 in precisely the same context of Identity and Difference as in 1924-27: that a One cannot even be thought without the Other, that being identical with itself and being different from something else are equally primordial (the heterothesis thesis: FS 172; cf. chap. 1 above). This is then developed into a contextual thesis: that an object cannot be thought without its state of affairs or "intentional nexus" (Bewandtnis: FS 323; cf. chap. 1 above) involving at least One and