in this very last (and so neglected) chapter, like "within-time-ness" and "world-time," are coined veritably at the last minute, on the verge of the composition of the never published Third Division. Moreover, in the interim, much has changed in the preceding terminological context (e.g., thrownness, understanding, but most pertinent here, Bewandtnis, the circumstantial nexus which is the being of handy things) which therefore gets "repeated" in chapter II. 4 of BT in ways that differ from the early article (e.g., "forgetting"). For all these reasons, these early pages on immediate (daily) time, its contrast with the extreme (original) time of the self, stand apart and alone as an especially unique "waymark" in Heidegger's development toward BT. To the reader of BT, they are familiar, and yet, so strange and unfamiliar. These matchless pages, unpolished and disjointed as they are, contain points and nuances-! have brought out the suggestive possibilities of only a few of them-to be found nowhere else on this stretch of Heidegger's Way. It is unfortunate for us that Heidegger tendered many of his points without developing them, no doubt because of the restrictions on length. But as a result, the text is more difficult and obscure than it might have been, and suggestive only with the application of effort by the reader versed in the chronological and doxographical context in which it was penned. One can therefore empathize with the puzzlement of its first two unsuspecting—not to say "unwashed"—readers, Rothacker and Kluckbohn, especially here but also in other sections. One can only wonder what reception the article would have encountered if it had in fact been published in early 1925. Clearly, Heidegger had a book-length idea on his hands.
The section concludes with a rehearsal of clearly ontological problems raised by the time of being-with-things: the nonrecurrability of the stream of time despite the recurrence of the heavens, the relation of time and place, time as principle of individuation. Aristotle's treatment of the relation of time to movement evokes the leitmotiv that will introduce the second, more overtly ontological draft of BT (GA 20:8/6): The history of the concept of time can be settled ultimately only if it is a history of ontology. Earlier, Heidegger had encountered an apparently linguistic but ultimately ontological problem which will plague him into the unpublished Third Division of BT, and beyond: the word "present" (Gegenwart) has in its meaning "a peculiar indifference" which conflates two different senses: "Anwesenheit in der Umwelt (die Präsenz), und dann das 'Jetzt' (das Präsens)." Thus, in the English, we have "present" as presence at a place or in a context ("Here!") and "present" as the temporal tense of the "now." The point is crucial for understanding Da-sein (here-being) as in-being, as Heidegger himself remarks in the margin. He then observes how "presentish" especially the primitive languages are, and looks to his own investigations on time to get to the bottom of the traditional