that the explanation of what truth is comes before the question of whether it can be apprehended and communicated.
But with regard to the very question of whether there is truth, we would choose to say that the obvious answer is “yes.” And then when we explain what truth is, we already presuppose that it is possible to make true statements about the essence of truth. The intention to discuss something presupposes the prospect and intention of clarifying it.
Basically, then, the question of whether there is any truth at all is already answered by the fact that we are discussing it. And (so one says) we answer the question [“Is there any truth?”] in the affirmative even when we deny that there is truth, insofar as the denial claims to be a true statement about the non-existence of truth. The denial of the existence of truth affirms the truth of the denial, and therefore the existence of truth. The positing of such a denial, which we usually call skepticism, contradicts itself and therefore is impossible.
So the outcome is: (a) The question that seems to be primary—whether there is truth at all—is not at all the first question. (b) In fact that question is not even the topic for a meaningful discussion insofar as it always presupposes the possibility of truth. At best, we can clarify in an explicit way the necessity of this presupposition. We might say that this task is the prolegomenon for any and all logic. [21]
There are no further grounds for asking an intelligent question that could get behind this basic presupposition that there is truth after all. Reflection has here reached a limit.
At this limit of reflection and discussion, the assurance that truth exists seems almost to be self-guaranteed. The possibility that skepticism could endanger the existence of truth is neutralized as soon as we realize that the skeptic refutes himself and cancels himself out, puts himself out of business as an alternative position.
But a refutation of skepticism is a refutation of every kind of relativism, every statement that there is no absolutely valid truth. For even the statement that there is only relative truth—if it is made in earnest—is self-contradictory. The statement says that it is absolutely the case that there is only relative truth. So there is at least one absolute truth. Consequently, the thesis itself is undermined, the position is untenable. So the situation is this: The question “What is truth?” is the basic question (1) because even the question of whether there is truth already presupposes the concept of truth, and (2) because likewise this question answers itself even before it is asked.
But the last reason we gave is ultimately not sustainable, because precisely when we formulate the question of a philosophizing logic, we have to doubt whether the problem of skepticism can be dismissed as cheaply and easily as that; whether it makes any sense to refute