of the guiding questions about mathematics and logic in the broadest sense, as well as his methodological reflection on the possibilities of a scientific solution to this question, finally led to the development of a new kind of research that Husserl called phenomenology. Husserl did not coin the term “phenomenology.” Rather, it is older and originated at the time of the Enlightenment—even Kant used it now and again—and the term became widely known through Hegel’s book, Phenomenology of Spirit. People commonly say that contemporary phenomenology has nothing to do with the Hegelian variety, but it is not that simple. With the proper precautions, we can say that contemporary phenomenology has a lot to do with Hegel—not with his Phenomenology, but with what he called logic. With certain reservations, we can identify that logic with contemporary phenomenological research.

I do not want to speak now about phenomenology itself, but only to clarify briefly what we mean by it. We do not mean “phenomenology” the way many of its disciples understand it—as a particular current in philosophy. Likewise, it is not essential that a so-called school of phenomenology exists. The crucial thing is the principle that guides the work, one that we call phenomenological. Taken as a whole, this principle is nothing new but is one of many issues in philosophy that go without saying. The principle is that we should inquire into and work upon the objects of philosophy just the way they show up. Thus, the tendency to press on to the real issues themselves, [33] to free them from presuppositions, overlays from the tradition, and hasty questions laden with presumptions. This is the proper thrust of phenomenology: to get to the real issues themselves. A “phenomenon” simply means a given object of philosophical research insofar as it is apprehended with the intention of understanding it as it is. So in a certain sense the word “phenomenon” always implies a task: negatively, protection against presuppositions and prejudgments; positively, to assure that the analysis of so-called phenomena must get clear with itself about which presuppositions it brings to the objects of philosophy. For ultimately we can show that no one can do without such presupposing, and therefore that the critique of the essential act of presupposing is an essential element of philosophical research. Right now I don’t want to go into a long methodological explanation of this. Instead, we shall proceed phenomenologically throughout this course. So when I use the word “phenomenon,” it should be understood in the sense I have just given. And we will be speak about the phenomenon of truth, the phenomenon of the proposition, the phenomenon of speaking, the phenomenon of time, and the like.

Husserl’s Logical Investigations gave contemporary logic a push that, relatively speaking, impelled it deeper into the dimension of philosophical questioning. But on the other hand, people generally neglected the