Prolegomenon

meant and the intuited. Therefore, truth is the specific relation (of identity) of a certain “just-as”: something is meant *just as* it is intuited.

“True-ness” now means the identity of the two parts of the relation. In this case, true-ness does not mean the actuality and kind of truth [that pertains to propositions]. Rather, it means what truth itself *is:* a recognized identity.

To be sure, we will leave open the question whether this is the final answer. In any case, this is the determination of truth that we have been looking for, namely, the interpretation that Husserl provides through his investigations into knowing as intentional comportment, or more precisely, knowing as intuition.^{86}

c) The connection between propositional and intuitional truth. The need to return to Aristotle

Let us hold on the point that truth is now determined not primarily in relation to the proposition, but rather in relation to [110] knowledge as intuition. We established the first determination of truth as validity, where truth characterizes the actuality of a true proposition, as λόγος-truth, that is, the truth of speech insofar as we take speech in the sense of the statement. Now we have made a statement not only about the actuality of what-is-true, but also about the structure of truth itself—namely, identity.

We essentially arrived at this second determination of truth by focusing on the act of knowing and specifically on knowing as intuition. This refers to intuition in the very broad sense that coincides with the Greek νοεῖν and which is also often indicated as αἴσθησις. When we take this second determination of truth also back to a Greek word, we see that now this second and authentic concept of truth constitutes the truth of νοῦς and the truth of intuition, or νοῦς-truth. I have already remarked that when I use this perhaps comic juxtaposition of Greek and German it is to show how these two questions about truth are geared to λόγος

86.An inherent consequence of the concept of intuition and of the understanding of truth in relation to intuition is that it is not merely “the synthesis of [true] representations” (according to Kant in his *Logic:* the representation of a representation). No, a manifold of intuitions plus their connections is not the only kind of truth. There is truth even where there is an isolated intuition: the intuition can be proven (or not) by what it intends. “Strict adequation can bring non-relating intentions as much as relating intentions into union with their complete fulfillments. If we now consider in particular the field of expressions, we need not concern ourselves only with judgments (i.e., the intentions and the fulfillments of statements). Rather, even acts of naming {“single-rayed” ideas} can also achieve their adequation.” Cf. *LU,* vol. 2, Sixth Investigation, §39, p. 768 (1913 ed., p. 125). [Husserl treats “single-rayed” ideas at, for example, ibid., vol. 2, §38, no. 2.]

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