and the intended holds, then eo ipso the relatum also holds in the sense that what is intended can itself now be designated as true. Now we have a situation that is the very opposite of the situation with Lotze. His treatment took off from the proposition and said: The proposition is valid, is true, and because the proposition is valid, therefore it is objectively valid of the thing. But in our treatment, because the proposition is provable in and by the thing—that is, because it belongs, as a relatum, to the subsisting relation of identity—therefore it subsists and holds, therefore it is valid. But now we take validity in the sense of the true-ness of propositions back to authentic truth in the sense of identity. From that, it follows that the truth of propositions, in the sense of validity, is a derived [112] phenomenon that is founded on the truth of intuition. Because truth in the sense of identity subsists, therefore the proposition is valid. When we speak here of “subsisting,” we mean the term precisely in Lotze’s sense, for Lotze says: “When relations subsist, we say they are actual.” Therefore, according to Lotze, relations have their kind of being as subsistence. But truth is a relation of identity between the intuited and the meant. Identity as truth subsists, and because it subsists, it is valid for a member of the relation, a member that can and should be proven.

Now the question comes up about what “subsisting” is supposed to mean here, that is, the subsistence of identity as such. This is the subsistence of the relation of intended and intuited or, as we formulated it above, the subsistence of the “just-as” relation. What is the status of this subsisting? In any case, when we talk about truth as identity, we are talking about a relation,⁸⁸ and specifically one that does not subsist between the thing and its determinations. So it is not the relation that subsists between, say, the chalkboard and its blackness. The relation we have in mind belongs to the content of both the intended and the intuited. We are talking about the relation of the intended propositional content [“This board is black”] to what is intuited [this chalkboard]. So there are two issues: (A) In the proposition as such, there is the so-called propositional relation in which the thing is intended according to its content; and equally, the content is also present in the thing that is intuited. (B) But further, in identity taken as truth, there is also a relation, that of the intended with regard to the intuited. We call this the “truth-relation” [Wahrverhalt], because it is a special relation, a relation of truth.

Now Husserl himself called this relation between the intended and the intuited a “content-relation” [Sachverhalt], and therefore, in accordance with its own structure, he brought it into line with the other content-relation, S = P, “This board is black” (the relation of black and

88. [Heidegger identifies Verhalt and Verhältnis at Moser, p. 236.21–22: “und zwar einem Verhalt, einem Verhältnis.”]