The problem of truth in the decisive origins of philosophical logic, and the seedbed of traditional logic
(focused on Aristotle)

Prefatory remark

[127] As we now discuss this question with a glance back to some texts of Aristotle, it does not mean that we are trying to give a complete interpretation of those texts. Let’s presuppose such an interpretation as having already been carried out. Then, using our guiding question, let us simply focus on some individual theses of Aristotle. Our investigation aims at an original understanding of the problem of truth and a radical way of solving it, one in which our investigation of the problem up to now will gain its legitimacy, and in which its positive content will come to light.

We begin our concrete investigation of the current determinations of truth by characterizing the truth of propositions. This is hardly accidental or arbitrary. We do so because according to the traditional report, the proposition or judgment is the proper place of truth. What is the connection here?

In §11, we will deal with the place of truth and with the proposition (λόγος). Out of those preliminary discussions will come the need to discuss the basic structure of λόγος and, in connection with that, to clarify the phenomenon of meaning.1

§11. The place of truth, and λόγος (proposition)

The thesis that the proper place of truth is the proposition or judgment must be understood as an image insofar as “place” is a spatial term,

1. [Here GA 21 omits Heidegger’s presentation of and commentary on the outline of §§11–15. Cf. Moser, pp. 261–262.]


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