When the chalkboard is perceived in its character as the subject matter of the statement, our having-it-present includes an experiential knowledge of its current suitability-for. The thing’s suitability-for is uncovered insofar as we already live in a disclosure of it.
As regards its basic meaning for us as a concerned being-unto-the-world, use is only a more accessible form of meaning. Existence is, in itself and by its very nature, world-open, open for the world; and corresponding to that, the world is dis-closed, opened-up. The primary form of that disclosedness is the opening up of whatever thing is being questioned.  Every form of speaking about things is, as an ontological comportment of existence, already grounded in existence as world-open. That is, all speech speaks about something that is somehow already disclosed.
Speaking indicatively about something—“this table here,” “that window over there,” “the chalk,” “the door”—already entails [their prior] disclosure. What does this disclosure consist in? Answer: the thing we encounter is uncovered in terms of the end-for-which of its serviceability. It is already posited in meaning—it already makes sense [be-deutet]. Do not understand this to mean that we were first given a something that is free of meaning, and then a meaning gets attached to it. Rather, what is first of all “given”—and we still have to determine what that word means—is the “for-writing,” the “for-entering-and-exiting,” the “for-illuminating,” the “for-sitting.” That is, writing, entering-exiting, sitting, and the like are what we are a priori involved with. What we know and learn when we “know our way around” are these uses-for-which we understand it.11
Every act of having things before our eyes, every act of perceiving them, is held within this [prior] disclosure of those things, a disclosure that things get from a primary making-sense-of-things in terms of their what-they’re-for. Every act of having something before our eyes and perceiving it, is in and of itself a matter of “having” something as something.12 Our directional being-unto-things-and-people functions within this structure of “something as something.” In short, it has the as-structure. However, this as-structure is not necessarily re-
11. A chalkboard, if it were unintelligible, would, as such, not be present here. Unless it were understood as for-writing-on, it would be hidden. The same with a door unless it is understood as for-entering-and-existing. These things are intelligible because we ourselves move among and operate with them, although we do so in such a taken-for-granted way that we forget this state of affairs in its basic structure as constituting these things. [GA 21 takes this footnote from Heidegger’s twentieth lecture on Tuesday, 8 December 1925 (cf. Moser, p. 307.19), and inserts it at this point in the nineteenth lecture of Monday, 7 December.]
12. This “having” is not a matter of merely observing. It is meant entirely in the sense of our everyday dealing with things.